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Italian Judicial Activism in Light of 
French and American Doctrines of Judicial Review 
and Administrative Decisionmaking:
The Case of Air Pollution
1. What makes Italian judicial activism unique
Italian judicial activism with respect to 
administrative action takes a form very different from 
judicial activism in the United States and France. Judges 
in all three countries are active in applying and shaping 
administrative law, but Italian judges are far more involved 
in substituting themselves for the public administration 
than French and American judges. French and American judges 
are limited to reviewing administrative decisions and to 
prodding the public administration into action. Although 
the activism of Italian judges may make sense in the context 
of the Italian public administration, their role as 
substitutes for that administration imposes political and 
economic costs that comparison with the United States and 
France will illustrate.
Air pollution law highlights the differences in 
Italian, French and American judicial activism especially 
well because it represents a relatively recent, major 
challenge to the legal systems of each of the three 
countries. Air pollution control also requires the public




























































































administration, whether through direct command and control 
regulatory techniques or through economic incentive 
techniques,! to deal with a multitude of pollution sources 
which have widely varying technical and economic 
characteristics. The longstanding problems of the Italian 
public administration have caused it to have much greater 
difficulties in addressing air pollution than the French and 
American public administrations have had.1 2 Accordingly, the 
Italian judiciary has mobilized in a unique way to meet the 
broad challenge posed by air pollution.
First, it has entertained aggressive criminal 
prosecutions of public officials and private parties for air 
pollution. Second, it has shown creativeness in developing 
its ability to hear civil and administrative actions 
concerning air pollution. By this conduct the Italian 
judiciary has acted as a substitute for regulation by the 
public administration, a role far more substantial than that 
assumed by French and American judges.
1. See Bruce A. Ackerman and Richard B. Stewart, "Reforming 
Environmental Law," 37 Stanford Law Review 1333 (1985).
2. See Bruno Dente, Peter Knoepfel, Rodolfo Lewanski, Sofia 
Mannozzi, and Silvia Tozzi, Il controllo dell'inquinamento 
atmosferico in Italia: analisi di una politica reoolativa 
(Roma, Officina Edizioni, 1984); Patrick Del Duca, "United 
States, French and Italian Air Pollution Control: Central 
and Local Relations as a Structural Determinant of Policy," 
10 Loyola of Los Angeles International and Comparative Law 
Journal 497 (1988).
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Absent legislative reform of the public administration, 
this judicial substitution will continue. Two developments 
even point to a reinforcement of the judicial role.
The 1986 law3 which created the Ministry of Environment 
further institutionalized the role of the judiciary as a 
substitute for the public administration. Its failure to 
establish the Ministry of Environment as an operating 
ministry with its own personnel meant continuation of the 
existing organizational weakness of the public 
administration. Moreover, the law's provision of private 
and public actions for environmental damage constitutes 
legislative recognition of the greater actual importance in 
environmental matters of the judiciary relative to the 
public administration.
Judicial reliance on European Community law is yet 
another development which may consolidate substitution of 
the Italian judiciary for the public administration.4 
Although EEC directives are intended to be primarily
3. Law no. 349 of July 8, 1986, Suopl■ ord. Gazz. Uff. 
no. 162 of July 15, 1986.
4. In France the traditional fear of judicial lawmaking, 
the wide margin of executive discretion, the routine 
application of Community law by administrative measures, and 
the hostility of French courts to Community law doctrines of 
supremacy, imply that the judiciary will have only limited 
opportunities to invoke Community law as a way of judicially 
influencing air pollution control policy. See Del Duca, 
supra n. 2.
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implemented at the member state level by legislative and 
administrative action, Italy has experienced significant 
delays in taking the necessary action. Thus, the judiciary, 
relying on the doctrine of the direct effectiveness against 
the state of sufficiently precise provisions of directives, 
may step into the breach. By this means Community and 
Italian legislation may come to further reinforce the 
judicial role in air pollution control.
The Italian judiciary's substitution of the public 
administration contrasts with the judicial role established 
by French and American doctrine on judicial review of 
administrative decisions. In both France and the United 
States this doctrine clearly limits the role of judges to 
review of the legality of decisions by the public 
administration.
The case law by which the Conseil d'Etat established 
the independence of the French administrative courts 
demonstrates that French judges are as capable of forceful 
activism as Italian judges. However, their forcefulness in 
matters of principle is blunted in practice by the 
traditional reluctance of the administrative courts to 
challenge specific administrative decisions. The statutory 
reform of the enauete publiaue proceeding provides an 
opportunity for the French courts to become more active in 
the review of administrative decisionmaking concerning air




























































































The contemporary American doctrine of judicial review 
of administrative decisions shares with the French doctrine 
the concept of judicial deference to the primary role of the 
public administration. However, the principle that a court 
may overturn decisions of the public administration if 
procedural values have not been respected is even more 
firmly established as the prevailing doctrine. In the 
United States it is also accepted as proper for the 
judiciary to oblige the public administration to take 
actions required by statute. But, even though this aspect 
of the role of judges in the United States is broader than 
that of French judges, it remains less aggressive than the 
direct judicial substitution for the public administration 
undertaken in Italy. After briefly reviewing the American 
"interest representation" model of judicial review, a case 
study of an administrative decision concerning air pollution 
will illustrate the United States theory of active 
procedural review, but substantive deference.
The contrast of the French and American situations to 
that of Italy will serve as the basis for some conclusions 
about the costs of Italian judicial activism. The 
structural reasons for which Italian judicial activism is 
unlikely to approximate the kinds of judicial activism in 
France and the United States will also be touched upon.
pollution, without however becoming substitutes for the
public administration as the Italian courts have done.




























































































Politics and the Italian public administrationa .
The active role of the Italian judiciary in air 
pollution control derives from general dissatisfaction with 
the Italian public administration. On a superficial level, 
it is easy to point to estimates that employees in some 
ministries work only two or three hours a day,5 and conclude 
that gross mismanagement is the problem. The difficulties 
of the Italian public administration, however, run much 
deeper and are the product of a complex history and 
contemporary politics.
The embrace of pluralist democratic politics after 
World War II in reaction to the fascist debacle was a clear 
effort to legitimize political decisionmaking. The 
coalition politics and lack of alternation of the holders of 
power which have succeeded fascism, however, have not been 
conducive to the development of an impartial, competent 
public administration. Although governments change often, 
the composition of the governing coalitions is remarkably 
stable. The lack of alternation in political control 
prevents sweeping changes. At the same time, the fragility 
of particular governments combined with the stable party 
composition of successive governments has proven a fertile 5
5. Sabino Cassese, Il sistema amministrativo italiano 119 
(Bologna, Il Mulino, 1983).




























































































ground for patronage. Despite constitutional checks on 
patronage, the direct infiltration of party control into the 
public administration has been massive.
Even beyond the identification of particular ministries 
with a certain party, the patronage phenomenon has 
influenced the administrative structure profoundly. In 
addition to the approximately twenty ministries composing 
the central government, there are two amministrazioni. four 
aziende autonome. and thousands of enti pubblici.6 The 
amministrazioni are the state monopolies (tobacco, matches) 
and the postal service. The aziende autonome are the 
railroads, the highway department, the phone company, and an 
organization concerned with agricultural stabilization.
Enti pubblici are a mixed bag of local and national guasi 
governmental organizations with responsibilities for 
municipal services, health care, pensions, and economic 
development. Many enti pubblici are simply publicly 
controlled business enterprises. The political parties have 
struggled mightily to use these various organizations to 
increase their power.7
6. Id. at 17-18.
7. For example, the boards of directors of the enti 
pubblici make ideal patronage posts for administrative 
officials. Id. at 73.
2 3 2 7 2 6 7 1  p x d  6 0 0 , 0 0 0 - 0 1 0



























































































In a country which suffers generally from chronic 
unemployment, and in which one area, the South, lags behind 
the rest of the country in economic development, there is a 
tendency to see employment in the public administration as a 
social welfare program. Although the Italian administration 
at the time of the unification of Italy was overwhelmingly 
dominated by Piedmontese, it has now become substantially 
meridionalized.8 Throughout the country, employees from 
southern Italy represent a disproportionate part of public 
employees,9 10and featherbedding of the work force would seem 
to be especially pronounced in southern Italy.1°
Although the political parties have penetrated deep 
into the public administration, the fragility of the 
governing coalition gives the administration a measure of 
independence. Bureaucrats remain in power much longer than 
individual ministers and governments. In fact, in 1921-1923 
with the rise of fascism and in 1945-1948 with its 
substitution by a democratic form of government, the Italian 
political elites completely changed. In the public
8. Id. at 115-17.
9. Id.
10. Id. at 282 gives the example of an office in Milan and 
an office in Naples with similar workloads. The Naples 
office had roughly a third more employees. (291 in Naples, 
193 in Milan).
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administration, however, there was substantial continuity.11 
Even today, Italian bureaucrats in positions of 
responsibility tend to be overwhelmingly men over fifty who 
have worked their way up through the ranks of the public 
administration.12 13
The weakness of Italian coalition governments has two 
immediate consequences —  the inability to organize the 
public administration and the inability to direct it.
With the passage of time, the organization problem 
becomes increasingly severe. It is evidently easier to add 
minor entities than to rework the underlying structure in a 
way that would have unforeseeable effects on party 
influence. Accordingly, the substantive division of 
responsibilities among the various ministries no longer 
corresponds to real social and governmental problems.11
11. Id. at 55-56.
12. Id. at 65-66. One survey of 1400 senior civil servants 
and members of parliament in seven western democracies 
(including the United States and France) found that, "The 
average senior Italian bureaucrat entered the civil service 
at the age of 22, and there he has stayed for thirty-five 
years. More than 90 percent of the members of this 
gerontocracy have spent their entire adult lives in national 
government and more than 80 percent have spent all this time 
in a single ministry. Lateral entrants into the Italian 
bureaucratic elite are virtually nonexistent." Joel D. 
Aberbach, Robert D. Putnam and Bert A. Rockman, Bureaucrats 
and Politicians in Western Democracies 70-71 (Cambridge, MA, 
Harvard University Press, 1981).
13. Cassese, supra n. 5 at 274-75. At 274 he observes, "II 
difetto principale dell'amministrazione italiana sta nella




























































































The recent creation of a Ministry of Environment is an 
example of this phenomenon.14 It is a ministry without 
portfolio and hence without any operating personnel. In 
connection with its creation no operating responsibilities 
were taken from any of the thirteen existing ministries with 
significant environmental responsibilities.15 The Ministry 
of Environment's most significant operational power is the 
authority to substitute itself directly for regional, 
provincial or municipal authorities whose failure to apply 
environmental protection laws may lead to serious 
environmental damage.16 How it will do so without personnel 
remains to be seen.
The inability of governments to direct the public 
administration has had a further negative consequence on 
parliamentary legislative activity. Italian legislation has 
become characterized by an excessive preoccupation for 
detail. Because governments have proven unable to direct
irrazionale distribuzione delle funzioni." (The principal 
defect of the Italian administration is in the irrational 
distribution of functions.)
14. Law no. 349 of July 8, 1986, Supnl. ord. Gazz. Uff. no. 
162 of July 15, 1986.
15. See The Law and Practice Relating to Pollution Control 
in Italy 20-22 (2nd ed., prepared by M. Guttieres, and U. 
Ruffolo for Environmental Resources Ltd., published by 
Graham and Trotman for the Commission of the European 
Community, 1982).
16. Article 8(3), law no. 349 of 1986.
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the public administration, parliament has reacted by 
attempting to provide minutely precise direction to 
administrative action. In practice the detail frequently 
turns out to overlook important problems of implementation 
or to result in insoluble complexity. The final result is 
paralysis of administrative action due to an interminable 
series of administrative, judicial, and political 
proceedings to determine the meaning of legislative 
pronouncements. Italian substantive law on air pollution 
manifestly suffers from this phenomenon.17
b. Criminal actions and prosecuting judges
In Italy criminal actions are often used to compensate 
for administrative deficiencies.18 These actions have been
17. Major Italian laws relevant to air pollution control 
include: Articles 216, 217 TULS approved by royal decree 
no. 1265 of July 27, 1934, Su p pI. ord. craz. uff, no. 186 of 
August 9, 1934; law no. 615 of July 13, 1966, Gaz, uff, no. 
201 of August 13, 1966; Presidential decree law no. 616 of 
July 24, 1977, Suppl. ord. gaz, uff, no. 234 of August 29, 
1977, in implementation of the delegation of law no. 382 of 
July 22, 1985, Gaz, uff, no. 220 of August 20, 1975; law 
no. 833 of December 23, 1978, Su p pI. ord. gaz, uff, no. 360 
of December 28, 1978; and Decree no. 30 of March 28, 1983 
Supp. ord. Gaz, uff, no. 145 of May 28, 1983. For review of 
these laws, see Del Duca, supra n. 2.
18. See Mario Cicala, Tutela dell'ambiente nel diritto 
amministrativo, penale, e civile 34-95 (Rovigno, UTET,
1976); Mario Pasquini, "Tutela della salute ed ambiente nei 
piu recenti orientamenti dottrinali e giurisprudenziali," in 
La Disciplina Giuridica della Protezione Contro Gli




























































































facilitated by the powers of pretori. A pretore is a 
magistrate whose subject matter jurisdiction includes all 
crimes with a maximum penalty of less than three years of 
imprisonment.19 The position of the pretore in Italy has 
been unique in that unlike other sitting Italian judges the 
pretore may initiate criminal actions and then pass judgment 
on them.20 21 The code of criminal procedure to enter into 
force October 24, 1989 will alter this state of affairs.21 
It provides that in a given case the same magistrate may not 
fulfill the functions of both public prosecutor and judge.22
Because of the nature of the judicial career in Italy, 
pretori are often relatively young and enthusiastic. They 
have therefore been disposed to look for new ways to apply 
long standing criminal law providing for light penalties to
Inquinamenti 71, 109 (Milano, Giuffre, 1980); Vittorio 
Denti, "Aspetti processuali della tutela dell'ambiente," in 
La responsabilità dell'impresa per i danni all'ambiente e ai 
consumatori, atti del convegno di studio. "Problemi attuali 
di diritto e procedura civile" 53 (Milano, Giuffre, 1978).
19. Artide 31, code of criminal procedure. Artide 7 of 
the new code of criminal procedure, to enter into force 
October 24, 1989, raises the outer limit from three years to 
four. Presidential decree law no. 447 of September 22,
1988, SUPP. ord. Gazz. uff, no. 250 of October 24, 1988 
(hereafter the "new code of criminal procedure").
20. Article 74, code of criminal procedure.
21. New code of criminal procedure, supra n. 19.
22. Article 34(3), new code of criminal procedure.
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environmental problems.23 Although the new code of criminal 
procedure will end a pretore's ability to pass judgment on 
self initiated prosecutions, there is no reason to believe 
that the magistrates responsible for exercising the 
functions of public prosecutor will be any less vigilant 
than the pretori have been or that pretori will be 
unreceptive to well founded actions which a public 
prosecutor initiates.
i. Actions against polluters
The criminal provision most relied on in air pollution 
prosecutions is article 674 of the criminal code, which 
condemns offensive emissions.24 One case involving 
prosecution under article 674 was against a gravel plant
23. One of the best known of the so-called pretori 
d'assaulto (assault judges) wrote a "how to" book to explain 
to local citizen groups how to provoke legal actions against 
polluters and inactive public officials. See
Gianfranco Amendola, In nome del popolo inquinato: Manuale 
giuridico di autodifesa ecologica (Milano, Franco Angeli 
Libri, 1985).
24. Criminal actions have been brought against polluters 
under a number of other statutory provisions. Article 635 
of the criminal code provides for criminal liability for 
damage to property. Article 650 of the criminal code, 
providing for up to three months in prison for nonobservance 
of public health regulations, is used as are various other 
provisions of the criminal code dealing with criminal 
negligence. See articles 449-452, 589, 590, 639, 659, 660, 
and 675, criminal code.




























































































causing air pollution.25 The plant had a permit under the 
1966 air pollution control law, which provides that the best 
technical controls possible are to be used.26 The court 
held that article 674 meant that even if there was an 
administrative authorization, there was still criminal 
liability for noncompliance with article 674's ban on 
offensive emissions.
Applying criminal liability regardless of the 
compliance with permit conditions manifests an evident 
distrust in the public administration. Moreover, the 
penalty provided by the 1966 law for violation of permit 
conditions is at most 3,000,000 lire27 (about $1,500), a sum 
which constitutes a minimal deterrent. By making recourse 
to article 674, there is at least the possibility of a short 
jail term, and the problems of proving a violation of permit
25. "Inquinamento atmosferico: Legge antismog e
contravvenzione punita ex art. 674 c.p.: scarichi in acque 
pubbliche di reflui industriali non autorizzati e non 
conformi ai massimi tabellari," Pretore di Menaggio, 
judgment of September 22, 1982, note by Paolo Nannarone, in 
60 II nuovo diritto; Rassegna Giuridica Pratica 58 (1983). 
See also Pretore of Naples, decision of November 6, 1979, 13 
Giurisprudenza di Merito II, 454 (1981) (finding article 674 
liability notwithstanding an administrative authorization 
under law no. 615 of 1966 if the law is violated or the 
authorization is otherwise not complied with).
26. Article N) O law no. 615 of 1966, suora n. 17.
27. Article 20, law no. 615 of 1966, suora n. 17 as
modified by articles 34(h), 113, law no. 689 of November 24, 
1981, Su p p . ord. aaz. uff. no. 329 of November 30, 1981 
(tripling the original criminal penalties).




























































































conditions are avoided. This does not mean that article 674 
by itself is an effective deterrent to pollution. By its 
very nature as a criminal provision, its use is limited to 
isolated, after the fact prosecutions. In the case just 
discussed the polluter was condemned to a 50,000 lire fine 
(about $25), hardly an effective deterrent.
The need to coordinate criminal code provisions with 
more recently adopted air pollution laws can produce forced 
results on occasion. For example, in a proceeding against 
managers of industrial installations near Taranto, the 
pretore distinguished between emissions of dust and smoke.28 
In this pretore's view the joint effect of article 674 of 
the criminal code and of the 1966 law on air pollution was 
as follows. With respect to smoke emissions, respect of the 
1966 law implied no possibility of criminal liability. On 
the other hand, with respect to dust emissions, compliance 
with the 1966 law was irrelevant to the existence of 
criminal liability under article 674. Without entering into 
the merit of the rather close statutory interpretation used 
to reach this conclusion, it is quite clear that the 
distinction has no rational scientific basis. This type of 
result is one of the costs of the lack of a coherent 28
28. Pretore of Taranto, judgment of July 14, 1982, 15 
Giurisprudenza di Merito II, 677 (1983).




























































































statutory scheme and of an effective public administration 
to manage the air pollution problem.
The actions so far discussed have had environmental 
benefits chiefly through their deterrent effect. That is, 
they work by inducing fear of penalties for not complying 
with what administrative scheme there might be or for 
causing emissions in violation of limits, albeit imprecise, 
established through criminal law. The more extreme form of 
this kind of action involves the use of the article 674 
criminal action as a complete substitute for effective 
administrative action.
An example is an article 674 proceeding brought by a 
pretore against essentially all of the major industries 
surrounding the city of Taranto.29 The investigations 
preliminary to issuing the decision took two years and 
involved numerous experts, citizen groups, and industry 
representatives. The result was four condemnations to 
fifteen days of arrest and three 600,000 lire fines (about 
$300), all suspended on condition that the offending 
conditions be eliminated within a year. Although the 
penalties imposed are light, the decision is important 
because it does what the public administration had not done
29. Pretore di Taranto, judgment no. 2095 of July 31, 1982 
1983 Rivista Penale 190, with note by Amedeo Postiglione, 
"Verso un diritto all'ambiente," 1983 Riv. pen. 196.
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i. e. provide for a way to require reduction in pollution 
levels. The case is a clear example of judicial 
substitution for the public administration. The kind of 
investigation undertaken and the information which had to be 
weighed are more typical of an administrative rather than a 
criminal proceeding.
ii. Actions against public officials
Article 28 of the constitution makes public employees 
criminally and civilly responsible for action not in accord 
with the law. Article 328 of the criminal code is the 
specific provision under which officials have been 
criminally prosecuted for failure to exercise review or 
decision functions with regard to air pollution.30 By 
making recourse to this provision the pretori are requiring 
officials of the public administration to act, a function 
ordinarily reserved to executive, legislative, and 
administrative authorities. The difficulty with relying on
30. E.q. Pretore Soave, judgment of May 9, 1978 in 55 
Foro amm. I, 2000 (1979); Pretore Gela, judgment of 
February 9, 1980, 86 La Giustizia Penale II, 109 (1981). 
See also Paolo Vittorio Lucchese, "Omessa istituzione del 
servizio di rilevamento dell'inquinamento atmosferico," 14 
Giurisprudenza di Merito IV, 487 (1982). In this article 
Lucchese, the pretore of Gela who wrote the judgment of 
February 9, 1980, explains to other pretori how to use 
article 328 to prosecute provincial administrations for 
failure to set up monitoring networks.






























































































criminal responsibility of pubUe-officials rather than on 
effective administrative or political accountability is the 
harshness of criminal sanctions for the lax exercise of 
often highly discretionary authority.
It is also difficult to identify which officials are in 
fact responsible for the complete absence of administrative 
capability to deal with air pollution problems. In one case 
this problem was overcome on the theory that the local 
pollution problem was so blatantly obvious that the head of 
the provincial administration which failed to create a 
monitoring network must have been aware of it.31 Citizen 
groups which wish to provoke prosecutions of public 
officials are advised to first call the problem to the 
attention of the officials in writing so as to create a 
record of willful neglect.33
Finally, criminal prosecutions occur only in limited 
cases and only after the fact of grave environmental damage. 
Accordingly, article 328 prosecutions may be useful, but are 
not as desirable as an effective public administration in 
the first instance would be.
The jurisprudence of the Court of Accounts, a special 
administrative court responsible for review of state *
31. Pretore Gela, suora n. 30
32. See Amendola, suora n. 23




























































































finances, has developed in a way such that its accounting 
actions serve a function quite similar to article 328 
criminal prosecutions of public officials.33 On the basis 
of provisions establishing the liability of public 
functionaries for damage caused to the state,34 the Court 
has held that public officials can be personally responsible 
for damages to the environment caused by failure to carry 
out their responsibilities or by negligent decisions.35 The 
facts related to an authorization to build a tourist village 
in a national park. In a subsequent appeal the Court 
reaffirmed this decision and specified that the damages were 
due to the state, not to municipalities or regions when 
functionaries or agents of the public administration were
33. On the Court of Accounts, see Francesco Di Renzo, La 
Corte dei Conte (Napoli, Società Editrice Napoletana, 1978). 
For discussion of the Court's activities with regard to air 
pollution, see Franco Giampietro, Diritto alla salubrità 
dell'ambiente: inquinamenti e riforma sanitaria 8-21 
(Milano, Giuffre 1980). Artide 18(2) of law no. 349 of 
July 8, 1986 preserves the Court of Accounts' jurisdiction.
34. Articles 82-83, royal decree no. 2440 of November 18, 
1923, Gaz, uff, no. 275 of November 23, 1923.
35. Court of Accounts, sez. I, decision no. 39 of May 15, 
1973, 49 Foro amm. I, section 3, 247 (1973). See also Court 
of Accounts, sez. I, decision no. 61 of October 8, 1979, 56 
Foro amm. I, 825 (1980) (official who authorized discharge 
of titanium oxide into the ocean near Livorno held 
personally liable for the damages incurred).
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prosecuted for environmental damages.36 Damages were 
finally assessed at one billion lire (about $500,000).37
The Court acknowledged the difficulties of quantifying 
in monetary terms the damage caused to the National Park by 
allowing the construction of fourteen kilometers of road and 
construction of a fifty hectare subdivision from 1962 to 
1964. It arrived at the damage assessed by considering 
estimates of the costs of destroying the subdivision, 
restoring the land, damage to the image of the park, and 
damage to flora and fauna.
Because the laws establishing the Court of Accounts' 
jurisdiction were enacted before environmental problems rose 
to public consciousness38 and hence do not specify a measure 
of environmental damages, the Court simply picked what it 
felt to be a reasonable figure. The 1936 law creating the 
Ministry of Environment subsequently specified criteria for 
quantifying damages.39 Damages are now to be calculated 
"equitably," taking into account the seriousness of 
individual fault, the cost of restoration, and the profit
36. Court of Accounts, sez. I, decision no. 108 of December 
20, 1975, 52 Foro amm. I, 1669 (1976).
37. Court of Accounts, sez. I, decision no. 86 of September 
18, 1980, 57 Foro amm. I, 975 (1981).
38. See Filippo Salvia, L'Inquinamento : Profili 
Pubblicistici 157-64 (Padova, CEDAM 1984).
39. Art. 18(6) of law no. 349 of July 8, 1986.




























































































realized by the defendant. Because state employees are 
unlikely to have the assets to pay large judgments, the 
determination of the particular amount of the damages may 
often be academic. In such cases, the assessment of damages 
is more a punishment than a means of compensating the state.
Actions before the Court of Accounts to recover damages 
to the state are brought by the Procuratore jenerale. a 
career prosecutor of the Court.40 Other parties may not 
bring actions in the public interest although they can 
always ask that an action be commenced and once an action 
has started, they may participate freely.41 The Court of 
Accounts has also allowed public entities to freely 
participate.42
c. Civil and administrative actions
The availability of the civil and administrative courts 
for environmental actions has increased greatly in recent
40. Article 195, Regolamento per l'amministrazione del 
patrimonio e per la contabilita generale dello stato, royal 
decree no. 827 of May 23, 1924, Su p p . ord. gaz, uff, no. 130 
of June 3, 1924; article 4, regolamento di procedura per i 
giudizi innanzi alla Corte dei Conti, royal decree no. 1038 
of August 13, 1933, Gaz, uff, no. 194 of August 22, 1933.
41. Artide 47, royal decree no. 1038, supra n. 40.
42. Court of Accounts, sez. riuniti, decision no. 290/A of 
October 29, 1981, 58 Foro amm. I, 1106 (1982).
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years, most notably after enactment of the law creating the 
Ministry of Environment,43 which also unequivocally 
established liability to the state for environmental damage. 
Before analyzing the liability provisions of this law, it 
will be useful to review the case law which anticipated it 
as a further illustration of Italian judicial activism.
The Court of Cassation, supported by the Constitutional 
Court44, broadened the standing criteria for environmental 
actions in the civil and administrative courts. It also 
made injunctive relief available against pollution 
responsible for health damage, a kind of relief not 
previously available. Each of these topics will be analyzed 
following some background on the distinction in Italy 
between civil and administrative jurisdictions.45
43. Law no. 349 of 1986, supra n.3.
44. Constitutional Court, decision no. 88 of July 26, 1979, 
53 Rac. Uff. 59 (1979); 24 Giur. cost. 656 (1979). In this 
decision the Constitutional Court has accepted the 
application of article 32 of the constitution to directly 
provide individual and collective rights to health. It has 
also found that articles 2043 and 2059 of the civil code, 
which concern compensation for damages, to be constitutional 
provided that they are interpreted to refer not just to 
property damages, but also to damage to the constitutionally 
protected right of health. Id. By this decision the Court 
rejects the previous doctrinal position that compensation 
was available only for loss of earning capacity. For review 
of previous Italian doctrine on personal injury 
compensation, see Adele Anzon, "L'altra 'faccia' del diritto 
alia salute," 24 Giur. cost. 657 (1979) (note).
45. The conversion of the Consiglio di Stato into an 
administrative court of second instance in 1971 by the
2 H 2 7 2 6 7 1  p x d  6 0 0 , 0 0 0 - 0 1 0



























































































The standing requirements before the civil and 
administrative courts are respectively a "subjective right" 
and a "legitimate interest." Private parties may bring 
actions against the public administration before both the 
civil and administrative courts according to the 
classification of the interest at issue. Simple interests 
are those where the individual has no particularized 
interest in the outcome of a decision beyond the general 
interest in sound public decisions. Such interests are not 
accorded any judicial protection.
At the other end of the scale are subjective rights, 
which are rights recognized as belonging exclusively to 
their owners and protected in a direct and immediate 
manner.46 Such interests may be protected by an ordinary 
civil action. Remedies include damages and injunctions 
staying the application of the adverse administrative 
decision.
Legitimate interests are ranked lower than subjective 
rights, but are actionable before the administrative courts. 
A legitimate interest is an individual interest strictly
creation of regional administrative courts of first instance 
has also broadened the accessibility of administrative 
justice. Law no. 1034 of December 6, 1971, Gaz, uff, no.
314 of December 13, 1971. The jurisdiction of the civil 
courts includes all criminal matters.
46. Guido Landi and Giuseppe Potenza, Manuale di diritto 
amministrativo 146 (7th ed., Milano, Giuffre, 1983).
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connected to a public interest and protected only in an 
action to protect the public interest.47 When the 
jurisdiction of the administrative courts is invoked to 
protect a legitimate interest, they have the power to annul 
the challenged order.
Whether a subjective right or a legitimate interest is 
involved depends on whether a norma di relazione or a norma 
di azione is at issue. A norma di relazione involves a 
direct relationship with an individual, whereas a norma di 
azione has to do with the functioning of the public 
administration. The subtleties of this distinction are 
illustrated by the example of expropriation.48 If there is 
a claim that the expropriating governmental body is not the 
correct one, or that there is a procedural flaw in the 
expropriation, the individual whose property is being 
expropriated has a legitimate interest to protect before the 
administrative courts. The individual's particular interest 
is made protectable by the general interest in the correct 
procedural functioning of the administration. In contrast, 
a claim that the compensation is inadequate is a claim of 
subjective right. The individual's property right is an
47. Id. at 149
48. Id. at 151
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individual, personal entitlement, which therefore is 
protectable before the ordinary courts.
These jurisdictional criteria for deciding between the 
civil and administrative courts are complex. In France, 
where there are also civil and administrative courts, the 
criterion is the simpler one of whether the suit is against 
the state.49 The complexity in Italy derives from the 1865 
law which gave the civil courts the power to entertain cases 
against the public administration when subjective rights are 
involved. Giving the ordinary courts this jurisdiction was 
seen as a guarantee of liberty because of the civil courts' 
greater independence and accessibility than the Council of 
State.50 The notion of legitimate interests as the criteria 
for administrative and civil jurisdiction entered Italian 
law through the 1889 law creating an adjudicative section in 
the Council of State.51 The ambiguities in the distinction
49. See text infra at notes 113 to 115.
50. See Mario P. Chiti, Partecipazione popolare e pubblica 
amministrazione 258-63 (Pisa, Pacini, 1977).
51. The provision is article 3, law no. 5992 of March 31, 
1889, now contained in article 26, Royal decree no. 1054 of 
June 26, 1924, Gaz, uff, no. 158 of July 7, 1924. 
Substantially unchanged, it reads, "Spetta al Consiglio di 
Stato in sede giurisdizionale di decidere sui ricorsi per 
incompetenza, per eccesso di potere o per violazione di 
legge, contro atti e provvedimenti di un'autorità 
amministrativa o di un corpo amministrativo deliberante, che 
abbiano per oggetto un interesse d'individui o di enti 
morali giuridici . . . ." (It is for the Council of State 
in its judicial capacity to decide on challenges for lack of
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between legitimate interest and subjective right are 
becoming increasingly apparent as the volume of 
administrative litigation grows and as the action of the 
public administration increases in scope.
i. Breaching jurisdictional boundaries
In the event of a dispute over whether the civil or 
administrative courts have jurisdiction, it is possible to 
ask the Court of Cassation for a preliminary ruling as to 
which court has jurisdiction.52 In a number of these 
preliminary rulings the Court of Cassation has enlarged the 
scope of actions entertainable before the civil courts, and 
by implication, before the administrative courts as well.
In a 1979 case52 3 the neighbors of a potential nuclear 
power plant site brought an action before a civil court 
asking for' a preliminary technical study before further 
decisions on siting the plant were made. A complex
jurisdiction, excess of authority or violations of law 
against acts and provisions of an administrative authority 
or a deliberative administrative body, which might have as 
their object an interest of an individual or of a legal 
person . . . . )
52. Articles 41 to 50, code of civil procedure.
53. Court of Cassation, sez. unite civili, decision no. 
1463 of March 9, 1979, ENEL v. Eusebione. 102 Foro it. I, 
939 (1979) (regolamento di giurisdizione).
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administrative procedure for siting nuclear plants was 
provided by law; however, in response to a request for a 
preliminary ruling on jurisdiction the Court of Cassation 
decided that the neighbors could bring their action in the 
civil courts.
The Court of Cassation distinguished between two kinds 
of interest: indivisible and divisible. Examples it gave of 
indivisible interests are national defense and public order. 
Divisible interests include health and environmental 
protection. In the Court's view, what distinguishes 
divisible from indivisible interests is the ability to 
identify an individual interest distinct from the collective 
interest. By limiting jurisdiction to those cases where an 
individual, i.e. divisible, interest can be identified, the 
Court's hope is to anchor itself on the slippery slope 
leading to full judicial involvement in political issues.
In this particular case, the Court found that the 
neighbors met the requirement for an actionable interest 
because their property and environmental interests as 
farmers were potentially violated. In this case, the 
plaintiffs needed to show a subjective right because they 
were attempting to bring their action before the civil 
courts. The Court held that their interests constituted a 
subjective right, rather than non actionable diffuse or 
indivisible interests, because they had particular interests 
distinct from the general interest.
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A subsequent decision of the Court of Cassation, issued 
only a few months later,54 amplifies the analysis of the 
preceding case. This decision was also rendered in a 
preliminary jurisdictional proceeding. In the suit three 
neighbors of the site of a proposed sewage plant for Naples 
complained that it would degrade environmental quality and 
produce noxious emissions. The Court held that even though 
the health interests involved were shared by an indefinite 
number of subjects, they still constituted an actionable 
subjective right by virtue of the constitutional declaration 
of the right to health in article 32 and the article 24 of 
the constitution guarantee of the ability to seek judicial 
protection of one's rights. The Court stated that the 
diffuse character of the interests at stake constituted no 
barrier to the existence of a subjective right.
Article 32 of the Italian constitution defines health 
as a fundamental individual right and a collective interest. 
Some doctrinal writers have suggested that the way the Court 
of Cassation has interpreted this constitutional provision 
should also have a broadening effect on the kinds of actions 
entertainable before the administrative courts. In 
particular, the Court of Cassation, in its role as the court
54. Court of Cassation, sez. unite civili, decision 
no. 5712 of October 6, 1979, Cassa per il Mezzogiorno v. 
Lanciano. 102 Foro it. I, 2302 (1979) (regolamento di 
giurisdizione).




























































































which draws the bounds of civil and administrative 
jurisdiction, could permit challenges by third parties 
against administrative authorizations which would lead air 
quality limits established by law to be exceeded, e.g. air 
pollution permits.55 Doctrine has already urged that the 
1978 law on health care reform56 accords individuals the 
necessary legitimate interest in health.57 Either the 1978 
law or the constitution itself could be the basis of 
allowing such actions.
The fact that interests in health are involved may be 
the determining factor to allow third party challenges to 
air pollution permits. The Court of Cassation has held that 
being a resident of a municipality is insufficient to accord 
a legitimate interest to challenge the award of a building 
permit.58 The factor distinguishing this case from the air 
pollution example is the direct relevance of health 
interests in the case of air pollution. Because of the 
health impacts of air pollution, the constitutional right to
55. For reservations about such a strategy, see Salvia, 
supra n. 38 at 80-83.
56. Law no. 833 of December 23, 1978, s u e d , ord. Gaz, uff. 
no. 360 of December 28, 1978.
57. Giampietro, supra n. 33 at 72.
58. Court of Cassation, sez. unite civili, decision no. 
5530 of October 25, 1982, Gaspari v. Rossi. 105 Foro it. I, 
2776 (1982) (regolamento di giurisdizione).
2 H 2 7 2 6 7 1  p x d  6 0 0 . 0 0 0 - 0 1 0  



























































































health may lead the Court of Cassation to find that there 
does exist the individual interest necessary to support 
standing and hence jurisdiction with respect to challenges 
of improperly granted air pollution permits.
The ultimate effect of the Court of Cassation's 
jurisprudence concerning the right to health could be that 
environmental claims might be made either to the civil or 
administrative courts depending on the remedy sought. For 
air pollution permits the difference in available remedies 
may not matter because a successful action in either set of 
courts could block the effectiveness of a permit. The 
possibility of raising environmental claims in either civil 
or administrative proceedings in combination with the direct 
effect of Community directives establishing air quality 
limits, a topic discussed below in section d, may become an 
important addition to the judicial tools for preventing 
environmental degradation.
ii. Expansion of injunctive remedies
In civil actions concerning air pollution, the 
provisions most relied on are article 2043 of the civil code 
dealing with damages for illicit conduct and article 844 of 
the civil code dealing with property rights. Peripherally
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relevant are articles 890, 2049, 2050, and 2051 of the civil 
code dealing with civil liability.59
In a civil action against a polluter, the two goals of 
the action are to obtain damages and to require that the 
offensive pollution cease. Until recently an action for 
both damages and an injunction was limited to property 
owners to protect their property rights. Judicial decisions 
have now changed this result by allowing individuals other 
than property owners to obtain injunctive relief to protect 
health rights.
Article 844 of the civil code permits a kind of 
nuisance action by property owners if levels of pollution 
exceed the "normal levels of tolerability."60 Article 2043
59. Article 890 provides that machinery or harmful 
materials placed on property must respect the required 
distances from the boundaries established by safety 
regulations, or in the absence of such regulations, the 
distances required for safety. Article 2049 makes 
principals responsible for negligence of their agents, e.g., 
an employer is responsible for acts of an employee. Article 
2050 makes anyone engaging in a hazardous activity 
responsible for the resulting damages unless they can show 
that they adopted all useful measures to avoid the damage. 
Article 2051 provides that the custodian of things is 
responsible for any damage they cause except in case of 
fortuity.
60. It provides, "Il proprietario di un fondo non può 
impedire immissioni di fumo o di calore, le esalizioni, i 
rumori, gli scuotimenti e simili propagazioni derivanti dal 
fondo del vicino, se non superano la normale tollerabilità, 
avuto anche riguardo alla condizione dei luoghi.
Nell'applicare questa norma l'autorità giudiziaria deve 
contemperare le esigenze della produzione con le ragioni 
della proprietà. Può tenere conto della priorità di un
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of the civil code is a general tort liability provision. It 
provides for award of damages whenever through negligent or 
intentional conduct an unjust injury is caused.61
Both the Constitutional Court62 and the Court of 
Cassation63 have taken article 844 at face value and 
considered it as dealing only with property rights. Article 
2043 has instead been used as the vehicle for giving content 
to the article 32 of the Constitution declaration of the 
right to health.64 The limitation of using articles 844 and
determinato uso."
(The proprietor of land cannot require cessation of 
ambient concentrations of smoke or heat, emissions, noises, 
vibrations and similar propagations deriving from land of a 
neighbor, unless they exceed the normal levels of 
tolerability, having regard to the condition of the 
surroundings. In applying this norm the judicial power must 
balance the needs of production with property rights. It 
may take account of the priority of a particular use.)
61. It provides: "Qualunque fatto doloso o colposo, che 
cagiona ad altri un danno ingiusto, obbliga colui che ha 
commesso il fatto a risarcire il danno." (Any intentional 
or negligent fact which causes another an unjust damage, 
obliges the one who committed the fact to compensate the 
damage.)
62. Constitutional Court, decision no. 247 of July 23,
1974, Dido V. Rosina. 42 Rac. Uff. 241, 245-46 (1974); 19 
Giur. cost. 2371, 2375 (1974).
63. Court of Cassation, decision no. 1976 of May 19, 1976, 
Giur. it. 1978, I, 1, 412; Court of Cassation, II sez., 
decision no. 2396 of April 6, 1983, Giur. it.■ 1984, I, 1, 
537, note by Fulvio Mastropaolo, at 559.
64. Constitutional Court, decision no. 247 of March 23, 
1974, supra n. 62; Court of Cassation, sez. I, decision no. 
837 of March 7, 1975, Società Roda v. Riaamonti. 45 Mass.
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2043 in this way was that injunctive relief was not 
available to prevent health damage. Article 844's provision 
for injunctive relief was limited to property rights, and 
article 2043 provided only for award of damages, not for 
injunctive relief. The Court of Cassation, in a case 
involving a noisy boiler in the central heating system of an 
apartment building, has since taken the position that 
because of the constitutional importance of the right to 
health, the injunctive powers available under article 844 
may by analogy be applied to prevent conditions causing 
health damages.65 6
iii. The broad concept of damages
In the same decision, the Court went on to conclude 
that damages under article 2043 were not limited to 
traditional property damages. To do so it had to overcome 
article 2059 which limits award of nonproperty damages to 
cases specifically determined by law.66 It overcame article 
2059 by determining that its reference to nonproperty
Giur. it. 228, 229 (1975) (headnote only).
65. Court of Cassation 1983 supra n. 63 at 560.
66. It provides, "Il danno non patrimoniale deve essere 
risarcito solo nei casi determinati dalla legge." (Non 
property damage must be compensated only in the cases 
determined by law.).
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damages meant only emotional and psychic damages ("dolore, 
sofferenza, tristezza,") i.e. pain and suffering.67 The 
Court had previously held that damages under article 2043 
were not limited to decrease in earning potential, but 
instead included the value of injuries per se.68 In the 
present decision the Court further broadened the kind of 
damages compensable under article 2043. After noting that 
article 2043 applied not to property damage, but rather to 
"unjust damages,"69 the Court defined unjust damage as 
including not only injury to the person objectively 
measurable in an economic sense, but also injury measurable 
only in a subjective way, i.e. biological and social 
damage.70 By taking this broad position on the recovery of 
damages, the Court has increased the capacity of the 
judiciary to substitute itself for the public administration
67. Court of Cassation 1983 supra n. 63 at 563.
68. Court of Cassation, III sez., decision no. 3675 of June 
6, 1981, Ferrane v. Lisi. 104 Foro it.. I, 1884, 1888-89 
(1981). Accord. Constitutional Court, decision no. 88 of 
July 26, 1979, supra n. 44.
69. Court of Cassation 1983, supra n. 63 at 562.
70. Unjust damage includes injury to "il complessivo valore 
della persona, nella sua proiezione non solo economica e 
oggettiva fatta palese del patrimonio, ma anche soggettiva 
(biologica e sociale) . . . "  Id. (the complete value of 
the person, not only in its economic and objective dimension 
made obvious by property, but also in the subjective 
dimension (biological and social) . . . ).
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in resolving environmental issues. The Constitutional Court 
has affirmed this orientation of the Court of Cassation.71 
The 1986 law which created the Ministry of Environment 
also provides for the recovery of environmental damages. 
Because its recovery provisions are limited to reimbursement 
of damages to the state, the previous jurisprudence on 
private recovery of damages would seem to have continuing 
viability. The 1986 law requires the author of "any 
negligent or intentional act in violation of law or 
provisions adopted on the basis of law which compromises the 
environment" to reimburse the state.72 The state and the 
relevant territorial entities are authorized to bring the 
appropriate actions for recovery in the ordinary courts.71 2345 
Associations designated by the Minister of Environment74 as 
well as "citizens" may "denounce the environmentally harmful 
acts" for the purpose of soliciting the State and the 
relevant territorial entities to bring recovery actions.75 
The provision for state recovery of damages is implicit
71. Constitutional Court, decision no. 184 of July 14,
1986, Gazz. uff.■ prima sérié spéciale no. 35 of July 23, 
1986.
72. Article 18(1), law no. 346 of July 8, 1986, supra n. 3.
73. Id.. Article 18(2).
74. See infra notes 78 to 80.
75. Article 18, law no. 346 of July 8, 1986, supra n.3.
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legislative recognition of the public administration's 
inability to prevent the infliction of damages in the first 
place.
iv. Environmental associations and standing
The broad conception of damages, the opportunity to 
generally obtain injunctive relief in civil actions, and the 
broadening of the jurisdictional criteria for the civil and 
administrative courts are contrasted by a seeming reserve 
against granting standing to public interest groups.76 The 
landmark legislation which created the Ministry of 
Environment and which expressly provided for the state's 
recovery of environmental damages also altered the position 
adopted by case law with regard to the standing of 
environmental associations.
Following the development of a complex body of case 
law, parliament granted to certain environmental protection 
associations the right to seek the annulment by the 
administrative courts of "illegitimate acts."77 The 
limitation of the right to seeking annulment, rather than 
recovery of damages, is consistent with the administrative
76. See Salvia, sunra n. 38 at 64-73.
77. Article 18(5), law no. 349 of 1986.
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courts' inability to award damages. The authorized 
associations are named by decree of the Minister of 
Environment.78 79 Associations eligible to be named are those 
of a national character and those present in at least five 
regions.78 The Minister is to choose these associations on 
the basis of their programmatic goals and of the democratic 
nature of their internal organization as established by 
their charter, as well as by the continuity of their action 
and of its external relevance.80 The case law leading up to 
this statute shows how judicial activism may stimulate 
legislative activity in Italy.
Italia Nostra, an Italian conservation group, was a 
pioneer in the effort to bring public interest actions.81 
It met with some success when the highest administrative 
court, the Council of State, granted it standing to 
challenge the administrative authorization of a road 
threatening a lake.82 The narrowly drawn decision
78. Article 13(1), id.
79. Id.
80. Id.
81. For a list of Italian environmental organizations and 
description of their activities, see Amedeo Postiglione, 
Manuale dell'Ambiente: Guida alla legislazione ambientale 
(Roma, La Nuova Italia Scientifica, 1984).
82. Council of State, sez. V, decision no. 253 of March 9, 
1973, Italia nostra v. Giunta provinciale di Trento. 97 
Foro it. Ili, 33 (1974).
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recognized it as a moral entity fulfilling a state role on 
the basis of its state charter. It was allowed to bring the 
action because its state charter anticipated such an 
activity. Shortly thereafter, in a criminal action against 
officials who expanded a campground in a public park, the 
Court of Cassation denied Italia Nostra standing to join the 
criminal proceeding as a civil party on the ground that it 
could show no damage to its interests.83
Then, even the Council of State denied Italia Nostra 
standing in a case involving construction which threatened 
the scenic beauty of a national park.84 The Council of 
State reasoned that there may exist a legitimate interest in 
environmental protection, but to bear such an interest, a 
group or individual must have a specific interest 
distinguishable from the general public interest. The 
Council of State found that as a national organization with 
an abstract charter, Italia Nostra did not have interests 
tied to a particular natural environment more or less 
definable in some way.
83. Court of Cassation, VI sez. (criminal), decision of 
January 15, 1974, 98 Foro it. II, 146 (1975) (To join 
criminal proceedings as a civil party, Italia Nostra would 
have to have suffered some private law property damage.
Moral injury is insufficient.).
84. Council of State, adunanza plenaria, decision no. 24 of 
October 19, 1979, Italia Nostra v. Sopraintendenza ai 
monumenti■ 132 Giur. it. Ill, section I, 81 (1980).
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These decisions against Italia Nostra limited the 
ability of environmental groups to undertake public interest 
litigation. The 1986 legislation overcomes the limitation 
only for associations designated by the Ministry of 
Environment in conformity with the statutory requirements. 
The limiting judicial decisions express the Italian concern 
for categorizing rights and interests, and thereby limiting 
standing to avoid involving courts in politically debated 
questions.
Nonetheless, the opening of the courts to individual 
claims of damage because of environmental degradation has 
had some effect on the treatment of associations. Even the 
Council of State appears willing to allow associations to 
bring administrative actions if they can show some specific 
damage. The Council of State has also determined that for 
purposes of intervening as amici curiae (intervento 
adesiyo), the degree of interest required by an association 
is less than if the association attempted to bring a 
proceeding on its own behalf. It accordingly allowed amicus 
interventions by Italia Nostra and the Italian chapter of 
the World Wildlife Fund in an administrative judicial 
proceeding.85 Likewise, pretori continue to allow
85. Council of State, sez. IV, decision no. 114 of February 
22, 1980, Soc. A. TRA. FO. V. DiBattista. 31 Consiglio di 
Stato I, 159, 162-63 (1980).
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individuals, local associations, and even Italia Nostra to 
participate as parties in criminal proceedings concerning 
environmental degradation.86 The Court of Cassation has 
even permitted a mayor, as representative of a municipality, 
to become a civil party to a criminal proceeding to seek 
damages for unauthorized construction.87 Finally, there is 
a persistent doctrinal current in favor of allowing both 
individuals and associations to bring environmental actions 
in competition with actions instituted by the public 
minister as representative of the public interest.88
The bottom line of the Italian jurisprudence on 
standing may be very similar to that of American 
jurisprudence. In 1972 the Sierra Club managed to have a 
case reach the United States Supreme Court in which it
86. See, é.q.. Pretore di Soave, judgment of May 9, 1978,
55 Foro amm. I, 2000 (1979) (but drawing the line to exclude 
political parties); Amedeo Postiglione, "Soggetti 
legittimati a far valere il danno da inquinamento 
atmosferico," in 1979 Giur. merito I, 407; Franco 
Fiandanese, "La tutela penale dell'ambiente. Aspetti 
generali," 88 Giust. pen. II, 594 (1983); Salvia, suora
n. 38 at 69 n. 60 (citing three criminal cases in which 
Italia nostra was permitted to intervene as a civil party). 
Allowing private parties to participate in criminal 
proceedings is an accepted procedural device in Italian law 
if they can show damages. See article 74 et sea., new code 
of criminal procedure, supra n. 19.
87. Court of Cassation, III sez. penale, decision of 
October 24, 1978, 85 La Giustizia Penale III, 13 (1980).
88. See Amedeo Postiglione, Il diritto all'ambiente 177-82, 
188-91 (Napoli, Jovene editore, 1982).
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asserted that as an association it was entitled to bring an 
action to block development of a ski resort.89 The Supreme 
Court denied that its "moral interest," to use the Italian 
terminology, in protecting the mountains was sufficient to 
accord it standing. By amending its complaint to allege 
that individual interests of its members in recreation were 
damaged, the Sierra Club was easily back in Court.90 The 
ultimate result in Italy may be similar. That is, 
environmental groups may be blocked from litigating on the 
basis of injury to their self declared purposes; however, it 
may be easy for them to demonstrate the required specific 
damage to obtain standing. And of course, if an association 
is duly designated by the Ministry of Environment, injury to 
its declared purposes would be a sufficient basis for it to 
bring an action for annulment of a decision by the public 
administration.
d. EEC environmental law as a new judicial tool
As a further spur to administrative action, the Italian 
judiciary may next look to the Community law doctrine of
89. Sierra Club v. Morton. 405 U.S. 727 (1972).
90. See William H. Rodgers, Handbook on Environmental Law 
23-25 (St. Paul, Minn., West Publishing Co., 1977).
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direct effect. The direct effect of directives has been 
developed through jurisprudence of the European Community 
Court of Justice not entirely self evident from a literal 
reading of Article 189 of the EEC Treaty.
Direct effect refers to the immediate effectiveness of 
provisions of Community law without the need to await member 
state implementing measures. The doctrine applies to three 
kinds of provisions of Community law. Regulations are made 
directly applicable by article 189 of the EEC treaty.
Certain treaty provisions are also by their terms directly 
applicable.91 The most remarkable application of the 
doctrine of direct effect is to directives. It is also the 
most important for environmental policy because of the 
quantity of environmental directives.
The application of the direct effect doctrine to 
directives is remarkable because pursuant to article 189(3) 
of the EEC treaty, member states are obliged to take steps 
to achieve the result sought by a directive, but the choice
91. See case 26/62, van Gend & Loos v. Nederlandse 
administratie der belastinaen. 1963 ECR 1 (increase in 
customs duty declared illegal pursuant to article 12, EEC 
treaty); case 6/64, Costa v. ENEL. 1964 EÇR 585 (article 53 
- free right of establishment, and article 37 - 
nondiscrimination against other member state nationals, are 
directly applicable); case 2/74 Revners v. Belgian State. 
1974 ECR 631 (article 52, dealing with freedom of 
establishment, directly applicable); case 33/74, Van 
Binsbergen v. Bestuur. 1974 ECR 1299 (article 59 with 
respect to right of establishment directly invalidates laws 
treating other member state nationals unequally).
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of methods to be employed is left to the member state. 
Notwithstanding this indication in the treaty that 
directives were intended chiefly to stimulate member state 
enactment of national law, the Court of Justice first held 
in 1970 that a provision of a directive may have direct 
effect.92 The Court of Justice has declared that 
directives, or parts of directives, may have effect in 
national law without any receiving activity under national 
law if they are unconditional and sufficiently precise.93 
In 1977 the Court of Justice held that national courts may 
invalidate national legislation and regulation pursuant to a 
directive and that Community rights may be invoked before 
any national judge.94 It said that any judge may determine 
not to apply national law in conflict with a directly 
effective provision without having to wait for any 
legislative or other constitutional procedure.95
92. Case 33/70, SpA SACE v . Ministry for Finance. 1970 ECR 
1213. See also case 41/74, Van Duvn v. Home Office. 1974 ECR 
1337; case 51/76, Verbond van Nederlandse Onderneminaen v. 
Inspecteur der Invoerrechten en Acciinzen. 1977 ECR 629.
93. For a review of the Court of Justice's jurisprudence on 
direct effect, see Pierre Pescatore (Judge at the European 
Court), "The Doctrine of 'Direct Effect': An Infant Disease 
of Community Law," 1983 European Law Review 155.
94. Case 106/77, Amministrazione delle Finanze dello Stato
v. Simmenthal S.p.A.. 1978 ECR 629.
95. Id. at 645-46.
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In 1979 the Court reaffirmed that when a directive 
allowed for an implementation period on the part of member 
states and a member state failed to implement the directive 
within the allowed time, then existing national legislation 
in conflict with the directive could no longer be applied by 
national courts. Only the provisions of the directive could 
be applied.®® The Court of Justice's jurisprudence on 
direct effect does not absolve member states of the 
obligation to implement directives by national law.96 7
In the early cases direct effect was invoked by an 
individual acting against a member state. Despite some 
suggestions in the Court of Justice's jurisprudence that an 
individual might invoke a directly effective provision of a 
directive against another individual,98 the Court has
96. Case 148/78, Pubblico Ministero V. Ratti. 1979 ECR 
1629; case 8/81, Ursula Becker v. Finanzamt
Munster-Innenstadt. 1982 ECR 53, 71 ("whereas the provisions 
of a directive appear, as far as their subject matter is 
concerned, to be unconditional and sufficiently precise, 
those provisions may, in the absence of implementing 
measures adopted within the prescribed period, be relied 
upon as against any national provision which is incompatible 
with the directive or in so far as the provisions define 
rights which individuals are able to assert against the 
State.").
97. Case 102/79, Commission v. Belgium. 1980 ECR 1473, 1487 
(direct effect of directive is no excuse for member state 
failing to incorporate it into national law).
98. See case 127/73 BRT v. SABAM. 1974 ECR 51, 62; case 
36/74, Walrave v. Association Union Cycliste Internationale. 
1974 ECR 1405, 1418-19; case 43/75, Defrenne v. Sabena. 1976 
ECR 455, 475; case 106/77, Amministrazione delle Finanze
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limited the doctrine of direct effectiveness to actions 
against a state." To do so, the Court relied on the 
provision of Article 189 of the EEC Treaty that a directive 
is binding only on the member states to which it is 
addressed. 1 "
The Court of Justice's declaration of the direct 
effectiveness of directives is not in itself sufficient to 
ensure that national courts will in fact give them direct 
effect. The Italian Constitutional Court only recently 
accepted the full supremacy of Community law over national 
legislation, more than twenty-five years after the entry 
into force of the EEC Treaty.i°i 910
dello Stato v. Simmenthal S.P.A.. 1978 ECR 629, 643. See 
also Alexander Easson, "Can Directives Impose Obligations on 
Individuals?" 4 European Law Review 67, 69 (1979); Gerhard 
Bebr, Development of Judicial Control of the European 
Communities (Nijhoff, the Hague, 1981).
99. Case 152/84, Marshall v. Southampton and South-West 
Hampshire Area Health Authority (Teaching)■ 1986 ECR 723.
100. But see Josephine Steiner, Textbook on EEC Law 26-27 
[citing cases 14/83 Von Colson and Karoann v. Land 
Nordrhein-Westfalen 1984 ECR 1981 and 79/83 Harz v. Deutsche 
Tradax GmbH 1984 ECR 1921] (Blackstone Press Limited, 
London, 1988), for review of Court of Justice holdings that 
the Article 5 of the EEC Treaty obligation that states "take 
all appropriate measures" to ensure compliance with their 
Community obligations obliges member state courts, as state 
authorities, to interpret national law consistently with the 
provisions of Community law. Such an obligation appears to 
extend even to state courts resolving disputes in which a 
state is not a defendant.
101. Constitutional Court, decision no. 170 of June 8,
1984, S.p.A. Granital v. Amministrazione finanziaria. ___
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The Court of Cassation has on occasion clearly rejected 
the direct effect of directives102 03; however, more recently 
it seems to be coming to accept the doctrine.1°3 The 
Council of State had adopted a more negative view.104 Any 
negative jurisprudence of the Council of State and of the 
Court of Cassation ought to be challenged before the 
Constitutional Court as contrary to the Constitutional
Rac. uff. ___ (1984); 29 Giur. cost. 1098 (1984). See
Antonio La Pergola and Patrick Del Duca, "Community Law, 
International Law, and the Italian Constitution," 79 
American Journal of International Law 598 (1985).
102. Court of Cassation, first civil section, decision no. 
797 of March 9, 1976, Creditwest v. Jenner. 99 Foro it. I, 
1542, 1544-45 (1976). See Raffaele Guariniello, "Diritto 
comunitario e sicurezza sul lavoro: il problema delle 
direttive inattuate," 135 Giur. it. IV, 1 (1983) (citing 
Court of Cassation, first civil section, decision no. 4686 
of July 21, 1981, Soc. Smithett v. Terruzzi. 22 Diritto 
comunitario e degli scambi internazionali 187, 193 (1983) 
(adopting the literal reading of article 189, EEC Treaty)).
103. Court of Cassation, first civil section, decision no. 
6523 of December 14, 1979, Foro italiana v. Amministrazione 
delle Finanze. 103 Foro it. I, 642, 648-49 (1980) (giving 
direct effect to Community directives on taxes having 
effects equivalent to tariffs); Case 88/82, Amministrazione 
delle Finanze v. Armando and Ottavio Leonelli. 1983 ECR 
1061, 1075 (provision of a directive revoking a prior 
regulation "aplies from the date of the notification of the 
said directive to the Member State in question, whether or 
not that Member State has already adopted the necessary 
measures to comply with the provisions of the directive."); 
Court of Cassation, first civil section, decision no. 6630 
of November 9, 1983, Ministero delle finanze v. Leonelli. 
107 Foro it. I, 76, 85 (1984).
104. Council of State, fourth section, decision no. 504 of 
May 6, 1980, S.P.A. Curtis v. Ministero della Sanità. 133 
Giur. it. Ill, section 1, 21, 26 (1981).
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Court's recent decisions concerning the article 11 of the 
Constitution incorporation of Community law into national
law.105
Notwithstanding the lack of unanimous and unambiguous 
guidance from the highest ordinary courts, one pretore has 
issued a judgment which fully embraces the concept of direct 
effect.105 06 In that case the pretore acquitted a person who 
marketed a shampoo which did not comply with Italian law's 
requirements on biodegradability of detergents, but which 
did comply with a Community directive which had not yet been 
implemented in Italy.
Various Community environmental directives contain 
directly effective provisions. With regard to air 
pollution, the directives on ambient air quality fix 
standards which Italy is unconditionally required to meet by 
a certain date and which are numerically defined.107 These 
directives also contain directly applicable provisions
105. See supra n. 101.
106. Pretore of Prato, judgment of May 31, 1978, reported 
in Dir, com, scambi. int. 1978, 739, and commented on by 
Carlo Mastellone, "The Judicial Application of Community Law 
in Italy, 1976-1980," 19 Common Market Law Review 153, 
159-160 (1983).
107. Directive 80/779/EEC of July 15, 1980, 23 O.J. Eur. 
Comm. (No. L 229) 30 (1980) (sulfur dioxide and 
particulates); Directive 82/884/EEC of December 3, 1982, 25 
O.J. Eur. Comm. (No. L 378) 15 (1982) (lead); Directive of 
March 7, 1985, 28 O.J. Eur. Comm. (No. L 87) 1 (1985) 
(nitrogen oxides).
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requiring that no action be taken which would degrade 
ambient air quality from present levels.i°8
If there is a right under national law for individuals 
to assert these rights against the state, then pursuant to 
the direct effect doctrine it would seem that the state can 
be prevented from taking action in contrast to them. For 
example, the state action violating the directly effective 
provisions of the sulfur dioxide and particulate directive 
setting ambient air quality standards would be the granting 
of a pollution permit which would lead to exceeding those 
standards. In Italy the jurisprudence relative to the right 
to a healthy environment may become a basis for individuals 
to be able to gain standing to assert that an administrative 
authorization which would lead to violation of the limits 
established by a directive would violate their rights to 
enjoy air quality at least as clean as that required by the 
directive.'
It is unclear whether such rights ought to be 
categorized as legitimate interests, as subjective rights, 
or as both. The confusion about the proper doctrinal 
classification of these rights and consequently about which 
court has jurisdiction over claims for their enforcement 
does not lessen the forcefulness of the Community law on 108
108. E.g. article 9, directive 80/779/EEC.
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direct effect. In an early case, the Court of Justice said 
that the classification of a right as a subjective right or 
as a legitimate interest was an internal matter for Italian 
law, but that whatever the answer the Community law right 
must be protected.109
If the Community directive is appropriately implemented 
by national law, the direct effect issue is moot. However, 
absent such implementation. Community norms may come to be 
viewed as a useful addition to the judiciary's arsenal of 
techniques for overcoming the inadequacies of the public 
administration. They may help prevent the worsening of air 
quality, and by paralyzing concession of new permits, they 
may awaken political interest in establishing an effective 
administrative system capable of ensuring the attainment of 
air quality goals.
3. France
French judges in the conduct of administrative law have 
been primarily concerned with ensuring that the public 
administration remains within the bounds of its powers 
established by law. The great strength of the public 
administration and of the executive in post war France has 109
109. Case 13/68, Salqoil v. Ministry of Foreign Trade. 1968 
ECR 662.
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challenged the highest French courts to ensure the principle 
of the rule of law. In meeting this challenge, French 
judges have established their potential for assertiveness. 
However, in practice French administrative judges have shown 
themselves reluctant to challenge the public administration 
with regard to particular decisions. The reform of the 
enouete publique procedure, previously a largely empty 
formality, provides for meaningful public participation and 
may make French administrative courts important actors in 
air pollution control efforts.
a. How the Conseil d'Etat established the independence of 
administrative judges
The traditional heavy reliance of French administrative 
law on administrative judicial reviewll° became even more 
necessary because of the constitutional remedy adopted to 
resolve the political instability of the Third and Fourth 
Republics. The 1958 constitution establishing the Fifth 
Republic gives truly remarkable powers to the president and 
the administration. A literal reading of the constitution 
could imply that these powers are unchecked by either 10
110. See Jean Waline, "L'évolution du contrôle de 
l'administration depuis un siecle," 100 Revue du droit 
public 1327 (1984).
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legislative or judicial authorities. However, the 
jurisprudence of the Conseil d'Etat. the highest 
administrative court, and to a lesser extent the 
constitutional establishment of a form of constitutional 
court have ensured continued respect for the rule of l a w . m
Prior to 1958, French constitutional law made the 
legislature the supreme source of law. Legislation could 
cover any topic; it was not subject to any kind of judicial 
constitutional review; and it certainly overruled an 
administrative act of the government. But, like in 
contemporary Italy, the incapacity of Parliament to pass 
laws in timely fashion made it necessary to grant quasi 
legislative powers to the government. In large part, the 
1958 Constitution was a "constitutionalization" of previous 
unconstitutional practices (decrets-lois. lois-cadres. 
etc.).
The profound innovation of the 1958 constitution was to 
grant the administration regulatory power independent of the 
legislature. Article 34 of the 1958 constitution spells out 
the limits of legislative powers.I12 Article 37 establishes 12
111. For recognition of this point, see Georges Vedel,
Droit Administratif 33, 380-86 (7th ed., Paris, Presses 
Universitaires de France, 1980).
112. Article 34 provides that legislative enactments, i.e. 
laws, are to fix the rules concerning civil rights, national 
defense, citizenship, marriage, inheritances, criminal law, 
taxation, nationalizations, and denationalizations. Laws
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the breadth of administrative power by providing that all 
matters not enumerated by article 34 fall within the realm 
of regulation.
Following adoption of the 1958 constitution, there was 
fear that article 37 granted uncontrolled discretion to the 
president and the administration. To appreciate how the 
administrative courts have avoided this result, it is 
necessary to understand their structure and history.
The administrative courts exist in France as the result 
of a unique notion of the separation of powers. The French 
view is that the judicial branch should not in any way 
interfere with the administrative or executive branch. Yet, 
there is the view that the administration must be subject to 
the law in two senses. Its acts should be subject to review 
for conformity with the law, and it should be responsible 
for damages it causes when it violates the law.
The jurisprudence as to the criteria for administrative 
jurisdiction has had a long evolution,113 and is now 
interpreted to establish the administrative courts as
are also to determine the fundamental principles of the 
organization of national defense, civil law, commercial law, 
and labor law. Article 34 further specifies that the budget 
and the general economic and social goals of the state are 
to be determined by law.
113. A famous milestone was Tribunal des conflits, decision 
•■of February 8, 1873, "Blanco," 1873 Receuil Dalloz. 
Jurisprudence. part III, 22.
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serving for any action against the state in the exercise of 
public power.114 In addition to actions against the state, 
actions may be brought against private entities exercising a 
public power.115 16
Although the Conseil d'Etat has a long history as an 
administrative court, the French administrative courts 
assumed their modern form in 1953 when tribunaux 
administratifs. administrative courts of first instance, 
were created. At that time the Conseil d'Etat became a 
court of appeal.115
Prior to the 1958 constitution the administrative 
courts reviewed the legality of administrative acts against 
the law, e.g. statutes and decrees, and against the quasi 
constitutional "general principles of law" (principes 
generaux du droite. The Consei] d'Etat has developed the 
concept of general principles of law through its case law. 
The concept includes many fundamental rights ordinarily 
considered part of constitutional law.117
114. Vedel, supra n. Ill at 146.
115. Id. at 150.
116. Decree of September 30, 1953. For the subsequent 
regulation of the tribunaux administratifs, see Andre de 
Laubadere, Traite de Droit administratif 427-30 (8th ed., 
Paris, Librairie generale de droit et de jurisprudence, 
1980).
117. The following have been identified as general 
principles of law: freedom of opinion and thought, freedom
2 H 2 7 2 6 7 1  p x d  6 0 0 , 0 0 0 - 0 1 0



























































































Article 37 of the 1958 constitution clearly removes a 
category of administrative acts from review in light of 
legislation. It does this by providing that if a subject 
matter is not specifically identified as within the scope of 
legislative regulation by statute, then it is reserved to 
the administration for regulation. The unanswered question 
at the adoption of the constitution was whether the 
administrative courts could continue to review 
administrative acts in light of the quasi constitutional 
general principles of law. The Conseil d'Etat said that 
they could.
The Conseil d'Btat's fundamental decision for ensuring 
the continued subjection of administrative acts to these 
almost common law constitutional principles occurred shortly 
after adoption of the 1958 constitution.H8 At issue was a 
provision of the 1946 constitution which gave the president 
of the council (prime minister) truly autonomous powers for 
"colonial" matters. The Conseil d'Etat held that even these 18
of commerce, equality, self defense in judicial proceedings, 
the adversary character of judicial proceedings, 
nonretroactivity of administrative decisions, the obligation 
of administrative impartiality, the obligation of the 
administration to indemnify its agents for condemnations 
pronounced against them when they were not at fault, the ban 
against the administration giving away public property, 
unjust enrichment, and double jeopardy. Id. at 375-76.
118. Council of State, decision of June 26, 1959, Syndicat 
des Inqenieurs-Conseils. 1959 Recueil Dalloz. Jurisprudence 
541, 542.
2 H 2 7 2 6 7 1  p x d  6 0 0 , 0 0 0 - 0 1 0



























































































powers were subject to general principles of law because of 
the preamble to the 1946 constitution. The preamble of the 
1946 constitution, which is incorporated by reference into 
the preamble of the 1958 constitution, provides:
Il [le peuple français] reaffirme solenellement 
les droits et les libertés de l'homme et du citoyen 
consacres par la Declaration des droits de 1789 et les 
principes fondamentaux reconnus par les lois de la 
Republique.119 120
Shortly afterwards, this jurisprudence was confirmed with 
respect to the exercise of the regulatory powers under 
article 37 of the 1958 constitution.I20
In addition to the administrative courts, the Conseil 
Constitutionnel is another guarantee of the rule of law in 
the French system. However, the Conseil Constitutionnel, 
unlike the Italian Constitutional Court or any American 
court, can only pass on the constitutionality of a law prior 
to its promulgation. The Conseil Constitutionnel acquires 
jurisdiction in two ways. Under article 61 of the 
constitution, it automatically passes on the
119. (The French people solemnly reaffirms the rights and 
liberties of man and of the citizen consecrated by the 
Declaration of rights of 1789 and the fundamental principles 
recognized by the laws of the Republic.)
120. Council of State, decision of October 28, 1960,
Martial de Laboulave. 1961 L'Actualité Juridique: Droit 
Administratif 20.
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constitutionality of organic laws. Organic laws are 
referred to in a number of articles of the constitution 
without being generally defined. From the constitution's 
references to organic laws, they can be categorized as 
treating the functioning or organization of the public 
authorities.121 12 Article 61 also permits the President, 
prime minister, or president of either house of parliament 
to submit a law to the Conseil Constitutionnel for review 
prior to promulgation. The 1974 amendment to article 61 of 
the constitution!22 extends this power to sixty deputies or 
sixty senators.
The effect of these provisions is that specific 
administrative acts cannot be challenged before the Conseil 
Constitutionnel as unconstitutional. For this reason the 
Conseil Constitutionnel has not constituted a limit on 
administrative discretion, even though its decisions are 
constitutipnally defined as definitive. Pursuant to the 
article 62 of the constitution's proclamation of the 
definitiveness of Conseil Constitutionnel decisions, the 
Conseil Constitutionnel's identification of constitutional
121. See Raymond Barrillon, Jean-Michel Berard, Marie 
Helene Berard, Georges Dupuis, Alain Grange-Cabane, and Yves 
Meny, Dictionnaire de la Constitution: La V' République 196 
(Paris, editions Cujas, 1976).
122. Constitutional law no. 74-904 of October 29, 1974,
1974 JO 11035.
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principles should be authoritative for the Conseil d'Etat. 
However, were the Conseil d'Etat to have a view different 
from that of the Conseil Constitutionnel. there is no 
mechanism to appeal a decision of the Conseil d'Etat to the 
Conseil Constitutionnel. This kind of conflict has in fact 
occurred with respect to the application of Community law in 
France.123
123. The French courts have conflicted on the acceptability 
of Community law. Article 55 of the constitution provides 
for the supremacy of regularly ratified or approved 
international law on condition of its reciprocal application 
by other states. In 1975 the Conseil Constitutionnel seemed 
to open the way for easy acceptance of Community law. 
Decision of January 15, 1975, 1975 Receuil Dalloz Sirev. 
Jurisprudence 529. In a decision involving a challenge to a 
proposed law on abortion as inconsistent with the European 
Convention on Human Rights, it held that refusing to apply a 
national law because of its inconsistency with an 
international rule is not constitutional review. Under this 
holding, the ordinary civil and administrative courts could 
address questions of the applicability of Community law and 
of its supremacy over national law without crossing the 
boundary into the territory of constitutional review, from 
which they are prohibited.
The Cour de Cassation a few months later followed the 
Conseil Constitutionnel's lead. Court of Cassation,
Chambres mixtes, decision of May 24, 1975, Administration 
des Douanes v. Société Vabre et Société Weigel. 1975 Receuil 
Dalloz Sirev. Jurisprudence 497, 506; 2 Common Market Law 
Review 336 (1975). It held that Community law took priority 
over national law enacted subsequent to ratification of the 
EEC Treaty. It also found that the power of member states 
to bring proceedings before the European Community Court of 
Justice against other member states which fail to comply 
with the EEC Treaty satisfied the reciprocity requirement. 
Shortly afterwards it held that the Treaty also prevails 
over earlier French legislation. Court of Cassation, third 
civil chamber, decision of December 15, 1975, von Kempis v. 
Geldof. 1976 Receuil Dalloz Sirev. Jurisprudence 33, 39-40;
2 Common Market Law Review 152 (1976).
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Nonetheless, on a large number of occasions the Conseil
Unfortunately for the application of Community 
jurisprudence, the Conseil d'Etat has rejected this 
principle. Council of State, decision of October 22, 1979, 
Union démocratique de travail. 36 L'Actualité Juridique: 
Droit Administratif 39 (1980). See also Council of State, 
decision of March 1, 1968, Syndicat general de fabricants de 
semoules. 1968 Recueil Dalloz Sirev 285, 286; 1970 Common 
Market Law Review 395 (refusal to disapply legislative text 
conflicting with earlier Community regulation). In a case 
challenging the election procedures for representatives to 
the European Parliament, the Conseil d'Etat observed that 
assessing the conformity of a national law adopted 
subsequent to the EEC Treaty would be equivalent to passing 
on its constitutionality, a power which the Conseil d'Etat 
does not have. Decision of October 22, 1979, id. If the 
Conseil d'Etat persists in its view that disapplication of a 
national law because of its nonconformity with Community law 
is a constitutional question, the effective supremacy of 
Community law will be seriously limited in France. This is 
because the Conseil Constitutionnel can only pass on the 
constitutionality of a law prior to its promulgation. 
Moreover, the Conseil d'Etat has created an additional 
barrier to the application of Community law in France. It 
has squarely rejected the Court of Justice's view of direct 
applicability by holding that only acts first received into 
national law may have any effect in internal law. Council 
of State, decision of December 22, 1978, Cohn-Bendit. 1979 
Recueil Dalloz Sirev. Jurisprudence 155; reconfirmed by 
Savincast. November 28, 1980, Centre international dentaire. 
February 25, 1981. •
• Even more threatening for the application of Community 
law than rejection of the direct effect doctrine is the 
reasoning by which the Conseil d'Etat reached this 
conclusion. The Conseil d'Etat rejected the direct effect 
doctrine based on a literal reading of article 189 of the 
treaty. It found the treaty language to be so clear that no 
reference to the Community Court was required to interpret 
it. Reliance on the so called acte clair doctrine provides 
the Conseil d'Etat with an easy way to avoid its obligations 
under article 177 of the EEC treaty to refer questions to 
the Court of Justice. See Gerhard Bebr, "The Rambling Ghost 
of 'Cohn-Bendit': Acte Clair and the Court of Justice," 20 
Common Market Law Review 439 (1983).
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Constitutionnel has recognized certain general principles of 
law as constitutional principles124 and thereby increased 
their persuasiveness as authority. Since its 1971 
decision12^ recognizing that the preamble of the French 
constitution, which makes broad statements about substantive 
and procedural rights, is a source of constitutional rights, 
the Conseil Constitutionnel has begun to play a much greater 
role in the elaboration of the content of French 
legislation.126 However, because of the fact that the 
Conseil Constitutionnel's jurisdiction can be invoked only 
when legislation is adopted and not at some later time when 
an actual controversy arises, it could not have preserved 
the independence of administrative judges in the way that 
the Conseil d'Etat did. Accordingly, the Conseit d'Etat's 
actions were all the more bold and essential.
124. See Vedel, supra n. Ill at 383 citing the following 
examples: freedom of association (decision of July 16, 1971, 
1972 Receuil Dalloz-Sirev. Jurisprudence 685; 1971 JO 7114); 
equality before the law (decision of December 27, 1973, 1973 
JO 14004); equality before the courts (decision of July 23, 
1975, 1976 L'Actualité Juridique: Droit Administratif 44; 
1975 JO 7533); equal treatment of civil servants (decision 
of July 15, 1976, 1976 L'Actualité Juridique: Droit 
Administratif 622; 1976 JO 4330).
125. Decision of July 16, 1971, 1972 Recueil Dalloz. 
Jurisprudence 685; 1972 JO 7114.
126. See Anna Devita, "I valori costituzionali come valori 
giuridici superiori nel sistema francese," 1984 Quaderni 
costituzionali 41.
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b. The new enouete publique: a potential remedy to
judicial reticence
Administrative actions for exceeding authority, 
although easily brought, have had limited importance because 
the administrative courts are unlikely to frustrate the 
public administration's intent. With regard to air 
pollution from industrial sources, the public 
administration's intent is expressed in permits granted 
under the authority of the Commissaire de la République, a 
local representative of the central government.127 The 
standard legal device for contesting a decision of the 
public administration, such as the grant of an air pollution 
permit, is a legal challenge for exceeding authority, known 
as recours pour exces du pouvoir.128 a s previously 1278
127. The principal French air pollution legislation is law 
no. 61-842 of August 2, 1961, 1961 JO 7195; law no. 76-663 
of July 19, 1976, 1976 JO 4320. See Del Duca, supra n. 2.
128. Vedel, supra n. Ill at 712. Directly damaged parties 
can-also seek damages and closure of the offending plant in 
the civil courts. Article 1382 et sea, of the civil code. 
The civil judge can order changes to minimize future damage 
as long as such orders do not conflict with orders of the 
administration. See Christian Gabolde, Les installations 
classées pour la protection de l'environment 324-25 
(Editions Sirey, 1978). However, like the administrative 
courts, the civil courts are reluctant to interfere with 
administrative authorizations by ordering closure of a 
plant. See The Law and Practice Relating to Pollution 
Control in France. 2d ed., at 5-6 citing Court of Cassation, 
Ch. civ., Premiere sect, civ., decision of November 5, 1963, 
1964 Receuil Dalloz. Jurisprudence 178 (Civil courts can




























































































discussed, a finding of exceeding authority can be based on 
violation of a specific legislative enactment or 
alternatively on violation of a general principle of law. A 
finding of exceeding authority results in annulment of the 
act challenged.
It is relatively easy to bring this kind of action.
The administrative courts grant capacite d'ester en justice 
(capacity to act) to associations, including those which are 
not formally registered with the authorities.129 Interet a 
aair (interest to act) is another kind of standing criterion 
which must be met. The interest must be legitimate and 
reasonable and must be personal to the individual or group 
bringing the action.130 Although the case law on this point
entertain nuisance actions, but they cannot contradict 
measures taken by the administration in the public interest. 
Closing a classified installation permitted by the public 
administration constitutes an impermissible contradiction.).
129. Id., at 725 citing Council of State, decision of March 
21, 1919, dame Polier. 1919 Receuil Dalloz. Jurisprudence 
part III, 1, 5 (the conclusions of M. Riboulet, commissaire 
du Gouvernement, at 2-3 are for an extremely broad view of 
the capacity to ester en justice^; decision of October 31, 
1969, Syndicat de Defense des Canaux de la Durance. 1970 
L'Actualité Juridique: Droit Administratif 252. Rene 
Hostiou, "Amenagment et environnement: le contentieux 
associatif devant les juridictions administratives," 10 
Droit et ville 215, 218 (1980).
130. Vedel, supra n. Ill at 725-29.
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is somewhat fragmented,131 it is clear that access to the 
administrative courts is relatively unrestricted.132 1345
The benefit of the liberality of standing is limited by 
the administrative courts' reluctance to correct 
administrative decisions.333 It is virtually impossible to 
obtain a stay of execution of a decision pending resolution 
of the judicial proceedings.334 Administrative judges seem 
to be less hesitant to reform administrative decisions 
concerning industrial sources of pollution than other 
matters.335 However, French administrative judges are 
generally likely to stress the positive aspects of 
"progress." On a basic political question, as for example 
nuclear power where proceedings brought by associations have
131. See id.
132. Environmental associations generally bring their 
actions on the theory of exceeding authority rather than as 
actions for indemnisation (compensation) because except for 
anglers associations, the conditions for establishing 
damages are too severe. Rene Hostiou, "Amenagement et 
environment: le contentieux associatif devant les 
juridictions administratives," 10 Droit et ville 215, 216-17 
(1980). In general, proceedings brought by associations 
have been useful for indicating gaps in the law and for 
clarifying informal administrative practices as expressed in 
circulaires, instructions. and directives. id. at 235-36.
133. Id. at 240.
134. See Francis Caballero, Essai sur la notion juridique 
de nuisance 124-25 (Paris, Librairie generale de droit et de 
jurisprudence, 1981).
135. Id. at 30-31.
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been systematically rejected,136 the courts are unlikely to 
run counter to the administration. A study of all the 
environmental decisions of the Conseil d'Etat from 1971 to 
1982 found that the Conseil d'Etat systematically decided 
against environmental interests, especially when the 
economic interests at stake were large.137 Finally, the 
French administrative judge does not have the power to issue 
injunctions against the administration; thus, enforcement of 
decisions can be difficult.138
The 1983 law reforming the procedure for the 
enouete publique139 may help overcome the reticence of 
administrative judges by its encouragement of public 
participation. Significantly, the heading of the law 
denominates its subject matter as the "democratization" of 
the enouete publicme.
An enouete publique is required for the award of an air 
pollution permit to an industrial facility.140 To obtain an 
authorization to operate an installation of the first class,
136. Hostiou, supra n. 132 at 233 note 6.
137. Francis Caballero, "Le Conseil d'Etat. Ennemi de 
l'environnement?" 1984 Revue Juridique de l'Environnement 3.
138. Id. at 242.
139. Law no. 83-630 of July 12, 1983, 1983 JO 2156.
140. The enouete is required by article 5, law no. 76-663 
of July 19, 1976, 1976 JO 4320, and by article 5 of the 
decree no. 77-1133 of September 21, 1977, 1977 JO 4897.
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i.e. an industrial installation of one of the categories 
judged to present serious pollution problems, a reguest must 
be made to the Commissaire de la République (the new name 
for the former departmental prefect)141 containing detailed 
site and process information142 as well as an environmental 
impact study.143 Because these studies are performed by the 
promoters of the project, they have been criticized as 
generally lacking in objectivity and completeness.144
After the request is completed, the enouete publique 
begins. The procedure for an enauete publique is for a 
designated person to receive comments from the public and 
then prepare and submit a report to the Commissaire de la 
République. The old procedure was widely criticized145
141. The structure of relations between the central 
government and the departements was modified by law no. 
82-213 of March 2, 1982, 1982 JO 730; and law no. 83-8 of 
January 7,, 1983, 1983 JO 215.
142. Article 2, decree no. 77-1133 of September 21, 1977, 
1977 JO 4897.
143. Article 2, law no. 76-629 of July 10, 1976, 1976 JO 
4203. Article 3(4), decree no. 77-1133 of September 21,
1977, 1977 JO 4897, reiterates the necessity of these impact 
studies for classified installation permits.
144. Gilbert-François Caty, "Associations écologiques 
s'organisent contre la pollution industrielle," 107 
Humanisme et Entreprise 1, 6 (77 rue de Villiers, 92 
Neuilly) (1980).
145. See id.; Hostiou, supra n. 132 at notes 6-7 
(describing the entire process as "une formalite dont 
l'objet n'est fondamentalement que de légitimer une decision 
elaboree unilatéralement par les pouvoirs publics" [a
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because the report had no legal effect at all on the 
permitting decision; the departmental prefect chose the 
person; the content of the report was completely at the 
person's discretion; the person chosen was usually a retired 
mayor or public functionary; and it was sufficient to 
publicize the enouete publiaue by posters in the town halls 
of the area the departmental prefect judged to be effected.
The reform made the procedure more serious.146 The 
administrative court of first instance for the area now 
designates the Commissaire or Commissaires for the 
investigation.147 Whether there is one or more depends on 
the "nature and importance of the operations."148 The 
Commissaire de la Reoubliaue. as the authority who has 
ultimate responsibility for the permitting decision, is 
obligated to publicize the enouete by all appropriate 
means.149 The enouete lasts from four to six weeks,150 and
formality whose fundamental purpose is to legitimate a 
decision unilaterally elaborated by the public 
authorities]); Cabellero, supra n. 131 at 162-68.
146. Law no. 83-630 of July 12, 1983, 1983 JO 2156. 
Preexisting laws remain in force to the extent they do not 
contradict the new law. Id., article 1.
147. Id., article 2.
148. Id.
149. Id., article 3.
150. Id.
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all interested parties must be heard.151 The eventual 
report must take account of all the counter proposals 
made.152
If the Commissaire de la Reoubliaue makes an 
affirmative decision notwithstanding a negative report by 
the Commissaire. or Commissaires. of the investigation, the 
competent administrative tribunal may annul the decision on 
one of the grounds identified in the report if it finds such 
a ground to be serious and of a nature to justify 
annulment.153 The persons investigating are paid by the 
state, but the other expenses of the investigation are born 
by the party seeking the permit.154
Following submission of the report the Commissaire de 
la Reoubliaue has three months to decide whether and on what 
terms to grant the authorization.155 Once the final
151. Id., article 4.
152. Id.
153. Id., article 6.
154. Id., article 8.
155. Article 11(2), decree no. 77-1133 of September 21, 
1977, 1977 JO 4897. This decree requires the Commissaire de 
la République to ask for a number of nonbinding opinions. 
They are from the municipal councils of the municipalities 
affected (article 8, id.) and various departmental services 
(article 9, id.). The prefect must present the report of 
the engineer of the corps des mines to the Conseil 
Départementale d'hygiene. before which the requestor of the 
authorization may appear, but from which third parties are 
excluded. Article 10, decree no. 77-1133. The Conseil
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decision is issued, the requestor of the permit has two 
months in which to seek administrative judicial review.156 
Private parties, including associations, and local 
government entities ordinarily have four years to seek 
administrative judicial review of the decision on the ground 
that it will create a public nuisance, endanger public 
health, public safety or environmental protection, or harm 
agriculture or historical sites.156 57
The enouete publiaue procedure is the primary way 
French judges become involved in air pollution matters. As 
in the United States, there is no combination of judicial 
and prosecutorial roles analogous to that of the Italian 
pretore, and more significantly, the judicial role is not 
one of active substitution of the public administration. 
Instead, the role is that of controlling the public 
administration's respect of statutorily imposed procedural 
values. The role of the French judge is, however,
Départementale d'hygiene is composed of doctors and sanitary 
engineers, as well as representatives of industry groups.
Law of February 15, 1902, article 776, Code of Public 
Health. For especially hazardous activities the opinion of 
the departmental council is required. Article 15, decree 
no. 77-1133. For activities affecting more than one 
department, the opinion of the regional council is 
requested. Article 16, id.
156. Article 14(1), law no. 76-663 of July 19, 1976, 1976 
JO 4320.
157. Article 14(2), id.
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potentially more aggressive than that of an American judge 
in that the French administrative court is apparently 
allowed to use its agreement with recommendations of the 
Commissaire of the investigation which were overlooked by 
the official who awarded the permit as the basis for 
overturning the award. Although this is a means for the 
French administrative court to enter in a limited way into 
the substance of administrative decisions, it does not 
constitute a judicial substitution for the public 
administration nearly as complete as that of the Italian 
judiciary.
4. American judges: active, but not Italian 
a. Substantive procedural activism
The theory of American judicial review of 
administrative decisionmaking resembles the theories of 
French and Italian judicial review. American judges, like 
French and Italian judges, are supposed to review 
administrative decisions to determine whether they conform 
to applicable substantive and procedural standards, without 
however, entering into the substance of the decision to the 
point of substituting their discretion for that of the 
administrative decisionmaker. Italian judges, of course, 
have not conformed their conduct to this theory. The
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reality of American judicial review is quite different from 
the Italian judicial substitution of the public 
administration, but bears substantial similarity to the new 
role suggested for French administrative judges by the 
reformed enauete publiaue procedure.
At an early stage, American constitutional and 
administrative law was concerned with whether discretionary 
authority could be delegated by the legislature to 
administrative bodies at all, but two 1935 decisions are the 
only United States Supreme Court cases finding 
unconstitutional delegation of legislative power to 
administrative authorities.158 The focus of American 
administrative law became the criteria pursuant to which 
judges would review administrative decisions.159 160
Although federal administrative decisions are 
ordinarily subject to the Administrative Procedure Act,l68 
most of the important decisions under the Federal Clean Air 
Act are instead subject to the Clean Air Act's own
158. Panama Refining Co. v. Rvan. 293 U.S. 388 (1935); 
A.L.A. Schechter Poultry Coro, v. United States. 295 U.S.
495 (1935). For an extensive review of American 
administrative law, see Kenneth Culp Davis, Administrative 
Law Treatise (2nd edition, 1978) .
159. For a suggestion that delegation doctrine be 
reexamined, see Richard B. Stewart, "Beyond Delegation 
Doctrine," 36 The American University Law Review 323 (1987).
160. 5 U.S.C. §§ 551 et sea.
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requirements.161 * Similar to the Administrative Procedure 
Act, the Clean Air Act requires a notice and comment 
procedure which establishes a written record on which 
judicial review is ultimately based. Grounds for judicially 
overturning a federal Environmental Protection Agency 
decision on air pollution include arbitrariness, 
unconstitutionality, exceeding statutory authority, and 
disrespect of procedure.162
The theory underlying the application of these 
statutory tests is the "interest representation model," a 
theory of public participation in administrative 
decisionmaking.^63 According to the interest representation 
model,
the function of administrative law is not the 
protection of private autonomy but the provision of a 
surrogate political process to ensure the fair
161. 42 U.S.C. § 7607(b), (d).
162. 42 U.S.C. § 7607(d)(9).
163. See Richard B. Stewart, "The Reformation of American
Administrative Law," 88 Harvard Law Review 1667, 1679-81
(1975); Stephen Breyer, Regulation and Its Reform 350-54
(Cambridge, MA, Harvard University Press, 1982); David M. 
O'Brien, "The Courts and Science Policy Disputes: A Review 
and Commentary on the Role of the Judiciary in Regulatory 
Politics," 4 Journal of Energy Law and Policy 81 (1983); 
Kathleen W. Marcel, "The Role of the Courts in A Legislative 
and Administrative Legal System —  The Use of Hard Look 
Review in Federal Environmental Litigation," 62 Oregon Law 
Review 403 (1983); Abram Chayes, "The Role of the Judge in 
Public Law Litigation," 89 Harvard Law Review 1281 (1976).
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representation of a wide range of affected interests in 
the process of administrative decision.164
Although the decision remains in the hands of the public 
administration, particular interests participate in 
developing the record on which the decision is made. 
Particular interests are given the right to comment on 
preliminary administrative conclusions and to present 
evidence to support their contentions. If they seek 
judicial review of the final decision, the decision is 
subject to invalidation if the reviewing court finds that 
there was insufficient administrative response to the 
particular interests' contentions.164 65
164. Stewart, supra n. 163 at 1670.
165. One difficulty with the interest representation model 
is that although in theory all interests are equally free to 
participate, those most directly affected generally have the 
most interest to participate. In addition, even directly 
interested parties may often lack adequate resources to 
participate. Accordingly, parties affected in a diffuse way 
and parties without resources will not participate unless 
organized and subsidized.
Another difficulty is that the interest representation 
model's focus on procedural and participation rights diverts 
attention from the merits. Commentators have come to 
question whether increased procedural requirements in fact 
have any long run impact on outcomes apart from delay. See 
Breyer, supra n. 163 at 346-50; Stewart, supra n. 163. 
However, with the current emphasis on deregulation, courts 
may give more weight to the legislative intent that 
bureaucratic programs be dismantled than to the procedural 
values of the interest representation model. Harvard Law 
Review 505 (1985). See Merrick B. Garland, "Deregulation 
and Judicial Review," 98 Harvard Law Review 505 (1985).
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In addition to actions based on the interest 
representation model, a federal court can become involved in 
air pollution decisionmaking as the result of a civil 
action, which under the Clear Air Act may be brought by any 
person, including legal persons, to correct a violation of 
the Act.I66 Such suits may be brought to require compliance 
with an emission limitation imposed under the Act or to 
require EPA to fulfill nondiscretionary duties imposed by 
the Act. Standing is granted to persons who can show 
"injury in fact" from an agency decision and to associations 
with at least one injured member.16 67
American judges have been instrumental in regard to air 
pollution matters. For example, the National Resources 
Defense Council in the early and middle 1970s challenged 
with some success the strictness of state implementation 
plans as approved by EPA in nine states.168 Also,
166. 42 U.S.C. § 7604.
167. See Association of Data Processing Service 
Organizations v. Camp. 397 U.S. 150 (1970); Sierra Club v. 
Morton. 405 U.S. 727 (1972); United States v. Students 
Challenging Regulatory Agency Procedures (SCRAPS. 412 U.S. 
669 (1973).
168. Lettie M. Wenner, The Environmental Decade in Court 45 
(Bloomington, Indiana University Press, 1982). Wenner 
cites: NRDC V. EPA. 421 U.S. 60 (1975); NRDC V. EPA.
484 F.2d 1331 (1st Cir. 1973); NRDC V. EPA. 494 F.2d 519 (2d 
cir. 1974); NRDC V. EPA. 489 F.2d 390 (5th Cir. 1974);
NRDC V. EPA. 483 F.2d 690 (8th Cir. 1973); NRDC V. EPA.
507 F.2d 905 (9th Cir. 1974); NRDC V. EPA. 481 F.2d 116 
(10th Cir. 1973).
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litigation initiated by the Sierra Club was instrumental in 
the adoption of the Clean Air Act provisions aimed at 
preventing deterioration of air quality in areas presently 
meeting air quality standards.169
b. An example of interest representation and judicial 
forcing, not substitution
The controversy over the level of pollution control to 
be required from new coal burning power plants illustrates 
how the interest representation model functions and how 
American judges work to prod the public administration to 
action, rather than themselves directly taking the 
appropriate action. In response to the 1970 Clean Air Act 
the federal Environmental Protection Agency (EPA) 
promulgated the first New Source Performance Standard (NSPS) 
for coal burning power plants in 1971.170 The Clean Air Act 
Amendments of 1977 gave EPA one year to promulgate a new 
standard.171 Faced with a Sierra Club suit in federal
169. Id.. at 46-47 citing Sierra Club v. Ruckelshaus. 344 
F.Supp. 253 (1972) ; Frie v. Sierra Club. 412 U.S. 541 
(1973); Clean Air Act, Part C-Prevention of Significant 
Deterioration of Air Quality, 42 U.S.C. §§ 7470-7479; H. H. 
Rep. No. 294, 95th Cong. 1st Sess. 7, reprinted in U.S. Code 
Cong. & Ad. News 1077, 1085.
170. 36 Fed. Reg. 24876 (Dec. 23, 1971).
171. 42 U.S.C. § 7411(b)(6).
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district court, EPA finally issued the new NSPS in 1979, 
almost a year late.172 The new NSPS was also challenged in 
the courts.
The controversial part of the second NSPS was the 
extent of additional control of sulfur dioxide. EPA 
performed extensive research and undertook resolution of 
conflicting interests, both of which a court would have been 
ill suited to do. In early 1977 EPA began the rulemaking 
process by hiring consulting firms to work on a variety of 
economic and engineering topics.173 EPA then formulated a 
tentative proposal which it used for internal discussion and 
to solicit comment from industry and environmental 
groups.174 EPA had consultants develop and run computer 
models of alternative standards and their effects.175
172. Sierra Club v. Costle. 657 F.2d 298, 316 (D.C. Cir. 
1981); 44 Fed. Reg. 33580 (June 11, 1979). See Elisabeth H. 
Haskell, The Politics of Clean Air: EPA Standards for Coal 
Burning Power Plants 1 (New York, Praeger Publishers, 1982).
173. Id. at 26.
174. The Teknekron/ICF account is drawn from Haskell. See 
Haskell at 26-27, 47-51.
175. Haskell at 49-50. EPA's models performed cost 
effectiveness analysis. Id. at 116. That is, they 
considered only the trade-offs involved in achieving 
particular reductions in emission. In effect, emissions 
were used as a surrogate for benefits. A true cost benefit 
analysis was not attempted because it would have required 
too much unavailable information. For example, it would 
have required predicting the actual location and sizes of 
new power plants, predicting the impact on air quality 
through dispersion modeling, estimating the size of the
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Many considerations which could not be reduced to a 
common metric were important in setting the final 
standard.176 In addition to overall levels of emissions, 
impacts on visibility in the West and acid rain in the East 
were concerns. Environmental problems other than air 
pollution, such as water use in the West and solid waste 
disposal had to be considered. The monetary costs to 
utilities and consumers and the political costs of altering 
the demands for high sulfur and low sulfur coal had to be 
balanced. To appreciate the intensity of the conflict 
between interests favoring continued use of higher sulfur 
eastern coal and those favoring development of lower sulfur 
western coal supplies, it can be noted that demand for 
western coal by midwestern utilities had risen from 0.1% of 
93 million tons bought in 1969 to 24.7% of the 119 million 
tons bought in 1977.177 Limiting oil consumption and 
maintaining reliability of electrical power generation were 
considerations. Judgments had to be made about 
technological questions such as the feasibility of scrubbers 
and baghouses, the amount of monitoring data statistically 
required to prove compliance, and the variability in sulfur
affected populations, and calculating actual harm based on 
dose-response relationships.
176. See Haskell at 112-13.
177. Haskell at 10.
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content of coal. Regional economic impacts and the 
investment behavior of utilities also had to be assessed.
In short, the standard depended on a large variety of 
variables, understanding some of which required simple, but 
extensive factual information and others of which required 
rather sophisticated technical knowledge. The decision 
required, however, was not amenable to purely technical 
resolution. It required a number of predictive factual 
judgments and substantial assessment of the relative values 
of various political interests.
Following promulgation of the NSPS, the Sierra Club, 
the Environmental Defense Fund, the California Air Resources 
Board, and industry groups challenged it in court. In a 121 
page opinion the Court of Appeals for the District of 
Columbia Circuit concluded that EPA had not exceeded its 
statutory authority and that the rule was reasonable.178
Although the modeling exercise was at the center of the 
standard's determination, it did not eliminate subjective 
assessments from the decisionmaking process. Indeed if it 
had, a reviewing court would have probably invalidated EPA's 
decision. The Court of Appeals stressed the importance of 
public participation by stating: 178
178. Sierra Club v. Costle. 657 F.2d 298 (D.C. Cir. 1981).
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We conclude that EPA's reliance on its model did not 
exceed the bounds of its usefulness and that its 
conduct of the modeling exercise was proper in all 
respects. We are in fact reassured by EPA's own 
consciousness of the limits of its model, and its 
invitation and response to public comment on all 
aspects of the model. The safety valves in the use of 
such sophisticated methodology are the requirement of 
public exposure of the assumptions and data 
incorporated into the analysis and the acceptance and 
consideration of public comment, the admission of 
uncertainties where they exist, and the insistence that 
ultimate responsibility for the policy decision remains 
with the agency rather than the computer. With these 
precautions the tools of econometric computer analysis 
can intelligently broaden rather than constrain the 
policymaker's options and avoid the 'artificial 
narrowing of options that can be arbitrary and 
capricious.'(footnotes omitted)179
179. Id. at 334-35. In subsequent litigation, despite not 
having prevailed, the Sierra Club and the Environmental 
Defense Fund argued that under the Clean Air Act,42 U.S.C. § 
7607(f), they were entitled to attorney fees for having 
represented the public interest. The Court of Appeals held 
that they were entitled to attorney fees, Sierra Club v. 
Gorsuch. 672 F.2d 33 (D.C. Cir. 1982)., and then awarded the 
Sierra Club a fee of about $45,000 and the Environmental 
Defense Fund about $46,000. Sierra Club v. Gorsuch.
684 F.2d 972 (D.C. Cir. 1982). The Supreme Court reversed, 
holding by a 5-4 vote that at least some measure of success 
on the merits was required for award of attorney fees. 
Ruckelshaus v. Sierra Club. 103 S.Ct. 3274 (1983).
Although none of the intervening groups was finally 
awarded attorney fees, this does not diminish the importance 
of their participation. EPA knowledge that the record it 
compiled and its use of the record would be subject to 
independent scrutiny substantially improved the rigor of its 
analysis. A corollary of this reasoning is that the Supreme 
Court erred in disallowing fees to the environmental groups. 
Even if the groups did not prevail on the merits, they 
should have been awarded fees to encourage the kinds of 
contributions they made to improving the decisionmaking 
process. Accord. Walter B. Russell and Paul Thomas Gregory, 
"Awards of Attorney's Fees in Environmental Litigation: 
Citizen Suits and the 'Appropriate' Standard (Note)," 18
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This case study contrasts, for example, with the 
litigation initiated by the pretore of Taranto.I80 In that 
case, the judge of first instance initiated a criminal 
prosecution of polluters in the absence of administrative 
action. In this case study judicial action served to force 
administrative action, action which made use of technical 
expertise and other resources not readily available to a 
judge. The difference in the reality of administrative 
organization and the different theories underlying judicial 
action both help to explain why the judicial roles vary so 
greatly.
5. Why Italian judicial activism probably will not follow
the French and American models
A comparative legal investigation necessarily focuses 
on limited analyses of parts of legal systems. On the basis 
of such an investigation it is accordingly difficult to 
prove that one form of legal organization in one system is 
superior to some other form in another system. Nonetheless, 
it does appear possible to suggest that the Italian form of 
judicial activism, although perhaps prudent for the Italian
Georgia Law Review 307 (1984).
180. See supra n. 28.
2 H 2 7 2 6 7 1  p x d  6 0 0 , 0 0 0 - 0 1 0  



























































































judiciary in the context of the Italian system, does have 
significant costs associated with it.
These costs relate to the fact that the Italian 
judiciary's substitution of the public administration arises 
in large part from the inadequacy of the public 
administration. Before dwelling on the consequences of this 
fact, it should be noted that the inadequacy of the public 
administration is not the only reason for the different role 
of the Italian judiciary. For instance, the combination of 
prosecutorial and judicial roles exemplified by the pretore 
is alien to the legal systems of both the United States and 
F r a n c e . M o r e o v e r ,  there is nothing in American 
constitutional law approximating the Italian constitutional 
notions of civil and criminal liability of public officials 
for failure to undertake discretionary responsibilities.
Nonetheless, judicial proceedings in Italy are all too 
frequently employed simply because the public administration 
has failed to act. Although they work to compensate 
failures of administrative control, they are not a fully 
adequate substitute because they are only isolated 
interventions which occur after the fact of damage. 
Preventive action through a broad based administrative
181. As discussed supra under heading 2(b), the new code of 
criminal procedure will abolish this dual role as of 
October 24, 1989.
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program is a more effective remedy for pollution related 
damages.I82 Moreover, the judiciary is not organized as it 
might be to fully confront environmental problems.183 For 
example, the effectiveness of criminal actions would be 
increased were all public prosecutors systematically 
organized to prosecute violations of environmental laws.184 
In the United States, federal judges have been involved 
in air pollution matters in two principal ways. First, they 
have reviewed administrative decisions for compliance with 
statutory and procedural concerns. Second, they have, in 
response to citizen suits, reguired the public 
administration to take action required by law. The interest 
representation model pursuant to which American judges 
review administrative decisions relies on judicial review to 
ensure meaningful public participation in those decisions.
182. For recognition of this principle by an Italian 
magistrate, see Franco Giampietro, Diritto alla salubrità 
dell'ambiente: inquinamenti e riforma sanitaria 7-8 (Milano, 
Giuffre, 1980).
183. However, its creativeness in dealing with the 
ineffectiveness of the public administration has been 
recognized. See e.g. The Law and Practice Relating to 
Pollution Control in Italy. 20-22 (2d ed., prepared by 
M. Guttieres and U. Ruffolo for Environmental Resources 
Ltd., published by Graham and Trotman for the Commission of 
the European Communities, 1982).
184. Filippo Salvia, L'inguinamento: Profili pubblicistici 
29 (Padova, CEDAM, 1984) laments the lack of attention 
devoted to the internal organization of the corps of public 
prosecutors.
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The seriousness of participation is assured by the judicial 
review of the observance of procedural rules regarding 
participation.
In France the Conseil d'Etat showed boldness in 
establishing the power of the administrative courts to 
review the legality of decisions by the public 
administration. However, in exercising their power, the 
French administrative courts have shown substantial 
deference to the public administration. The 1983 law 
reforming the enouete publique procedure suggests that 
something approximating the interest representation model 
could develop in France. The 1983 law permits dissent to be 
effectively registered in the course of the enouete and 
invites the reviewing judge to reverse the administrative 
decision if public input was wrongly overlooked. The 
enouete procedure and French administrative courts are not 
identical to American notice and comment rulemaking and 
federal courts. They are, however, similar in that the 
judicial role is to review, or at most stimulate, 
administrative action.
Because of the lack of a coherent and functional 
administrative system, the United States and French models 
of judicially enforced participation have not been relevant 
to Italy. Nonetheless, judicial review of respect for 
procedural requirements designed to ensure both 
participation and administrative responsiveness to that
2 H 2 7 2 6 7 1  p x d  6 0 0 , 0 0 0 - 0 1 0



























































































participation seems to be an effective technique for 
promoting good public administration. Participation with 
the option of judicial review works to ensure the 
application of the underlying substantive rules. Further, 
it ensures a meaningful dialog between the public 
administration and concerned parties. However, it does 
presuppose the existence and functioning of a certain level 
of administrative organization.
Were reform efforts in Italy to succeed in revitalizing 
the public administration, efforts to change the present 
role of the judiciary would be advisable. The pathological 
situation of the judiciary having to substitute itself for 
the pul^ic administration would be made to evolve into a 
situation in which the judiciary ensures compliance by the 
public administration with statutory policies. To the 
extent that revitalization of the public administration is 
not possible, Italy will continue to see its competent and 
ambitious judiciary assume an ever more active role as an 
alternative to a functioning public administration.
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